United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana
RULING AND ORDER DISMISSING SOCIAL SECURITY
RICHARTTL. BOURGEOIS, JR. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Morehead (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a
final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (“Commissioner”) pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) denying Plaintiff's application for
Disability Insurance Benefits under the Social Security Act.
(R. Doc. 1). Having found all of the procedural prerequisites
met (Tr. 1-4), the Court has properly reviewed
Plaintiff's appeal. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
20 C.F.R. § 404.981 (“The Appeals Council's
decision, or the decision of the administrative law judge if
the request for review is denied, is binding unless
you… file an action in Federal district
court…”). For the reasons given below, the Court
ORDERS that the decision of the Commissioner
be AFFIRMED and Plaintiff's appeal be
DISMISSED with prejudice.
filed an application for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income on August 23, 2013 alleging that
she became disabled on January 4, 2011 because of a disabling
condition, namely neck and back problems, asthma, panic
attacks, anxiety, and peptostreptococcus infection (Tr. 157).
Plaintiff's application was denied by an Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”), who first held an
administrative hearing (Tr. 28-58) before issuing an
unfavorable decision on December 3, 2014. (Tr. 12-27).
Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision
was denied by the Appeals Council on April 26, 2016. (Tr.
1-4). The ALJ's decision rested as the Commissioner's
final decision when the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff's request for review. See 20 C.F.R.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Court's review of the Commissioner's decision is
limited to an inquiry into whether there is substantial
evidence to support the findings of the Commissioner and
whether the correct legal standards were applied. 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
401 (1971); Falco v. Shalala, 27 F.3d 160, 162 (5th
Cir. 1994); Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1021
(5th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence has been defined as
“‘more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.'”
Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting
Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. N.L.R.B., 305
U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (defining “substantial
evidence” in the context of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)). The Fifth Circuit
has further held that substantial evidence “must do
more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to
be established, but no substantial evidence will be found
only where there is a conspicuous absence of credible choices
or no contrary medical evidence.” Hames v.
Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1983) (quotations
omitted). Conflicts in the evidence are for the Commissioner
“and not the courts to resolve.” Selders v.
Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1990). The Court
may not reweigh the evidence, try the case de novo,
or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner
even if it finds that the evidence preponderates against the
Commissioner's decision. See, e.g., Bowling
v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1994)
(“This is so because substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance but more than a scintilla.”);
Hollis v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1383 (5th Cir. 1988)
(“In applying the substantial evidence standard, we
must carefully scrutinize the record to determine if, in
fact, such evidence is present; at the same time, however, we
may neither reweigh the evidence in the record nor substitute
our judgment for the Secretary's.”); Harrell v.
Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 1988) (same).
Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial
evidence, then it is conclusive and must be upheld.
Estate of Morris v. Shalala, 207 F.3d 744, 745 (5th
Cir. 2000). If, on the other hand, the Commissioner fails to
apply the correct legal standards, or fails to provide a
reviewing court with a sufficient basis to determine that the
correct legal principles were followed, it is grounds for
reversal. Bradley v. Bowen, 809 F.2d 1054, 1057 (5th
determining disability, the Commissioner (through an ALJ)
works through a five-step sequential evaluation process.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The burden
rests upon the claimant throughout the first four steps of
this five-step process to prove disability. If the claimant
is successful in sustaining his or her burden at each of the
first four steps, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at
step five. See Muse v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 785, 789
(5th Cir. 1991) (explaining the five-step process). First,
the claimant must prove he is not currently engaged in
substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b).
Second, the claimant must prove his or her impairment is
“severe” in that it “significantly limits
your physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities…” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). At
step three, the ALJ must conclude the claimant is disabled if
he proves that his or her impairments meet or are medically
equivalent to one of the impairments contained in the Listing
of Impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d)
(step three of sequential process); 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt.
P, app'x 1 (Listing of Impairments). Fourth, the claimant
bears the burden of proving he is incapable of meeting the
physical and mental demands of his or her past relevant work.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).
claimant is successful at all four of the preceding steps
then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove,
considering the claimant's residual functional capacity,
age, education and past work experience, that he or she is
capable of performing other work. 20 C.F.R §
404.1520(g)(1). If the Commissioner proves other work exists
which the claimant can perform, the claimant is given the
chance to prove that he or she cannot, in fact, perform that
work. Muse, 925 F.2d at 789.
the ALJ made the following determinations:
1. Plaintiff had met the insured status requirements of the
Social Security Act through December 31, 2017.
2. Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since January 4, 2011.
3. Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments:
residual effects of cervical and lumbar surgery,
asthma/chronic bronchitis, depression, and anxiety.
4. Plaintiff did not meet or medically equal any listed
5. Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to
perform sedentary work, except she is able to lift-carry 10
pounds occasionally, 5 pounds frequently; she is precluded
from doing overhead work or work involving extreme range of
motion of the neck; she is limited to only occasional
interaction with the public and working with things, rather
6. Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work.
7. Plaintiff was born on February 17, 1968 and was 42 years
old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49 on