United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
ORDER & REASONS
M. AFRICK UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by defendant
Toyota Motor Credit Corporation (“TMCC”) against
pro se plaintiff Landry Dixon. Dixon alleges violations by
TMCC of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) arising
out of his purchase of a Toyota Corolla. TMCC argues that
it was not involved in financing Dixon's purchase and has
no contractual relationship with any party in the
case. As such, TMCC contends that Dixon has not,
and cannot, offered any evidence to show that TMCC is liable
for any alleged violations of the TILA and the ADA arising
out of the purchase.
17, 2017, the Court ordered Dixon both to respond to
TMCC's argument that TMCC was not involved in Dixon's
purchase, and to submit any evidence in his possession that
supports his claims against TMCC. The Court warned Dixon that
his failure to respond to TMCC's motion may result in the
granting of summary judgment in favor of TMCC, or in the
dismissal of all claims against TMCC for failure to
prosecute, or both. Dixon did not respond to the Court's
judgment is proper when, after reviewing the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any
affidavits, the court determines that there is no genuine
dispute of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the
initial responsibility of informing the district court of the
basis for its motion and identifying those portions of [the
record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The party seeking
summary judgment need not produce evidence negating the
existence of material fact, but need only point out the
absence of evidence supporting the other party's case.
Id.; Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190,
1195 (5th Cir. 1986).
the party seeking summary judgment carries its initial
burden, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific
facts showing that there is a genuine dispute of material
fact for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The showing of a
genuine issue of material fact is not satisfied by creating
“‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts, ' by ‘conclusory allegations, ' by
‘unsubstantiated assertions, ' or by only a
‘scintilla' of evidence.” Little v.
Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)
(citations omitted). Instead, a genuine issue of material
fact exists when the “evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The party responding to the motion for
summary judgment may not rest upon the pleadings, but must
identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue.
Id. The nonmoving party's evidence, however,
“is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are
to be drawn in [the nonmoving party's] favor.”
Id. at 255; see also Hunt v. Cromartie, 526
U.S. 541, 552 (1999).
has met its initial summary judgment burden by pointing out
that the record is devoid of any evidence supporting
Dixon's claims that TMCC can be held liable for alleged
violations of the TILA and the ADA arising out of Dixon's
purchase of the Toyota Corolla. Celotex, 477 U.S. at
323; Fontenot, 780 F.2d at 1195. Dixon, on the other
hand, has not met his corresponding burden. Dixon has failed
to respond to TMCC's motion in any respect. Moreover,
Dixon has failed to submit any evidence in his possession
supporting his case against TMCC, despite the Court's
order to do so.
Dixon's failure to respond to TMCC's motion, Dixon
has not met his burden of identifying specific facts that
establish a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 587;
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. As no reasonable jury
could return a verdict in favor of Dixon on his claims
against TMCC, the Court concludes that summary judgment in
TMCC's favor is warranted. See Anderson, 477
U.S. at 248.
IT IS ORDERED that TMCC's motion for
summary judgment is GRANTED, and all claims
against TMCC in the above-captioned matter are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
 R. Doc. No. 22.
 See R. Doc. No. 1
 R. Doc. No. 22-1, at 4-5.