from the Fourth Judicial District Court for the Parish of
Ouachita, Louisiana Trial Court No. 15-F3044 Honorable Carl
Van Sharp, Judge
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT By: Douglas Lee Harville Counsel
S. TEW District Attorney Counsel for Appellee.
NICOLAS ANDERSON Assistant District Attorney.
DREW, GARRETT, and COX, JJ.
defendant, Keith Barron, appeals his conviction for
aggravated battery. For the following reasons, we affirm the
conviction and sentence.
December 2015, Barron had an altercation with the victim,
Tonya Ard, at the apartment they shared in Monroe. Barron cut
Ard's throat and stabbed her numerous times in the
abdomen. Ard survived the attack and identified Barron as the
assailant. An arrest warrant was issued for Barron. He was
found in Shreveport and arrested pursuant to the warrant. He
was charged with attempted second degree murder. Barron
claimed that he acted in self-defense. Following a
trial, the jury convicted Barron of the responsive verdict of
aggravated battery. Motions for post verdict judgment of
acquittal, arrest of judgment, and new trial were denied.
Barron was sentenced to serve ten years at hard labor. He
appealed, claiming there was insufficient evidence upon which
to base the conviction and that the trial court gave an
erroneous jury instruction on self-defense.
OF THE EVIDENCE
claims there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he was guilty of aggravated battery.
This argument is without merit.
standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the
evidence claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560
(1979); State v. Tate, 2001-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851
So.2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S.Ct.
1604, 158 L.Ed.2d 248 (2004); State v. Carter, 42,
894 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/9/08), 974 So.2d 181, writ
denied, 2008-0499 (La. 11/14/08), 996 So.2d 1086. This
standard, now legislatively embodied in La.C.Cr.P. art. 821,
does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to
substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of
the fact finder. State v. Pigford, 2005-0477 (La.
2/22/06), 922 So.2d 517; State v. Dotie, 43, 819
(La.App. 2 Cir. 1/14/09), 1 So.3d 833, writ denied,
2009-0310 (La. 11/6/09), 21 So.3d 297.
Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving
both direct and circumstantial evidence. An appellate court
reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in such cases must
resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When
the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by
the direct evidence and inferred from the circumstances
established by that evidence must be sufficient for a
rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of
the crime. State v. Sutton, 436 So.2d 471 (La.
1983); State v. Speed, 43, 786 (La.App. 2 Cir.
1/14/09), 2 So.3d 582, writ denied, 2009-0372 (La.
11/6/09), 21 So.3d 299; State v. Parker, 42, 311
(La.App. 2 Cir. 8/15/07), 963 So.2d 497, writ
denied, 2007-2053 (La. 3/7/08), 977 So.2d 896; State
v. Robinson, 50, 643 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/22/16), 197 So.3d
717, writ denied, 2016-1479 (La. 5/19/17), ___So.
3d___, 2017 WL 2784240; State v. Sullivan, 51, 180
(La.App. 2 Cir. 2/15/17), 216 So.3d 175.
appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses
or reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 1994-3116 (La.
10/16/95), 661 So.2d 442. A reviewing court accords great
deference to the fact finder's decision to accept or
reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part.
State v. Eason, 43, 788 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/25/09), 3
So.3d 685, writ denied, 2009-0725 (La. 12/11/09), 23
So.3d 913; State v. Hill, 42, 025 (La.App. 2 Cir.
5/9/07), 956 So.2d 758, writ denied, 2007-1209 (La.
12/14/07), 970 So.2d 529; State v. Randle, 49, 952
(La.App. 2 Cir. 6/24/15), 166 So.3d 465; State v.
Casaday, 49, 679 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/27/15), 162 So.3d
578, writ denied, 2015-0607 (La. 2/5/16), 186 So.3d
trier of fact is charged to make a credibility determination
and may, within the bounds of rationality, accept or reject
the testimony of any witness; thus, a reviewing court may
impinge on the fact finder's discretion only to the
extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental due process of
law. State v. Casey, 1999-0023 (La. 1/26/00), 775
So.2d 1022, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S.Ct.
104, 148 L.Ed.2d 62 (2000); State v. Green, 49, 741
(La.App. 2 Cir. 4/15/15), 164 So.3d 331.
there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the
resolution of which depends upon a determination of the
credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight
of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v.
Speed, supra; State v. Allen, 36, 180
(La.App. 2 Cir. 9/18/02), 828 So.2d 622, writs
denied, 2002-2595 (La. 3/28/03), 840 So.2d 566,
2002-2997 (La. 6/27/03), 847 So.2d 1255, cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1185, 124 S.Ct. 1404, 158 L.Ed.2d 90
(2004). In the absence of internal contradiction or
irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence, one
witness's testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is
sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion.
State v. Randle, supra; State v.
Francis, 51, 048 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/11/17), 213 So.3d
battery is the intentional use of force or violence upon the
person of another. See La. R.S. 14:33. An aggravated
battery is a battery committed with a dangerous weapon.
See La. R.S. 14:34. "Dangerous weapon"
includes any instrumentality, which, in the manner used, is
calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm.
See La. R.S. 14:2. Aggravated battery is a
responsive verdict to attempted second degree murder.
La.C.Cr.P. art. 814(4).
La. R.S. 14:18 provides, in part:
The fact that an offender's conduct is justifiable,
although otherwise criminal, shall constitute a defense to
prosecution for any crime based on that conduct. This defense
of justification can be claimed under the following
. . . .
(7) When the offender's conduct is in defense of persons
or of property under any of the circumstances described in