United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana
ROAD SPRINKLER FITTERS UNION NO. 669, U.A., AFL-CIO
CCR FIRE PROTECTION, LLC
Wilder-Doomes, Magistrate Judge
RULING AND ORDER
W. DEGRAVELLES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT
matter comes before the Court on motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
filed by Defendant Earl Barnett (“Barnett”).
(Doc. 55.) Plaintiff Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No.
669, U.A., AFL-CIO (“Plaintiff”) has filed an
Opposition (Doc. 60), and Barnett filed a Reply brief (Doc.
63). Oral argument is not necessary. After
carefully considering the law, the arguments of the parties,
and the documents attached to Plaintiff's Original and
Amended Complaints, for the reasons stated below, IT IS
ORDERED that Barnett's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's alter ego claim against
Barnett in Plaintiff's Substituted Amended Complaint
(Doc. 54) are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE because it is
unsupported by sufficient factual allegations. The mere fact
that Barnett is said to be an owner of Quick Response,
CCR's successor company, and that he was the designer and
salesperson for Defendant CCR is insufficient to support the
conclusion that Barnett acted as an alter ego of CCR.
(See Docs. 1 at 3, 4; 54 at 3, 4.) The alter ego
doctrine may only be applied if “the owner exercised
complete control over the corporation with respect to the
transaction at issue.” Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v.
Gov't of Turkmenistan (“Bridas II”), 447
F.3d 411, 416 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Bridas S.A.P.I.C.
v. Government of Turkmenistan (“Bridas I”),
345 F.3d 347, 359 (5th Cir. 2003.) Therefore, without the
allegation of such a legal relationship between CCR and
Barnett, or factual information regarding Barnett's
individual role in the negotiation and breach of the
agreement, Plaintiff's alter ego claim against Barnett
must fail as a matter of law.
the CBA itself -submitted by the Plaintiff as an exhibit to
its original and substituted amended complaints (see
Docs. 1-1 at 1-2; 54-1 at 1-2, 5-7)- further undermines the
factual basis of Plaintiff's alter ego claim, as it
indicates that Barnett, in his individual capacity, was not a
signatory to the collective bargaining agreement
(“CBA”) between Plaintiff and CCR; that he did
not participate in the CBA negotiations; and that,
consequently, he had no involvement in the settlement
negotiations that arose out of CCR's alleged breach of
the CBA. Specifically, in the original and substituted
amended complaints, Plaintiff attached a copy of the CBA
between it and CCR; Barnett's signature does not appear
anywhere on the contract. (Docs. 1-1 at 1-2; 54-1 at 1-2.)
the above, Plaintiff has not set forth any documentation, nor
has it alleged anything to even suggest that Barnett was
personally involved in the CBA, its breach, or the resulting
settlement upon which CCR reneged; thus, the Court cannot
reasonably draw an inference that Barnett had the requisite
control over CCR with respect to the CBA that is necessary to
pierce the corporate veil under the alter ego
doctrine. To the contrary, the signed CBA between
Plaintiff and CCR that conspicuously lacks Barnett's
signature, creates a reasonable inference that Barnett never
had any involvement in the negotiations between CCR and
Plaintiff, the resulting CBA, or CCR's subsequent breach
and settlement agreement.
light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the
Substituted First Amended Complaint does not plead facts
sufficient to state an alter ego claim against Barnett that
is plausible on its face. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's
claim against Barnett must be dismissed.
“the policy of the federal rules is to permit liberal
pleading and amendment, thus facilitating adjudication on the
merits while avoiding an excessive formalism, ” this
Court has explained that there acceptable justifications for
denying leave to amend. Williams v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 154 F.Supp.3d 407, 426 (M.D. La.
2015) (quoting Jamieson By and Through Jamieson v.
Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985.)) Among these
justifications are repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
prior amendment, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and
the futility of the amendment. Id.
Plaintiff had ample opportunity to cure the deficiencies of
its original Complaint with respect to its claim against
Barnett and failed to do so. Specifically, Plaintiff
submitted a proposed First Amended Complaint in attempts to
enhance and amplify its claim as to the individual liability
of Barnett in order to survive a motion to dismiss. (Docs. 37
at 2; 37-1.) Judge Wilder-Doomes concluded that
Plaintiff's proposed First Amended Complaint, like the
original Complaint, stated insufficient facts to establish
how Barnett could be held individually liable.(Doc. 53 at 9.)
Plaintiff then filed its Substituted First Amended Complaint,
which contained allegations against Barnett that are
identical to those contained in its original Complaint, and
are again insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims against Barnett
are dismissed with prejudice.
 The factual and procedural history of
this case is outlined in Judge Wilder-Doomes' Ruling and
Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File First
Amended Complaint (see Doc. 53 at 1-3), and is
incorporated by reference herein.
 “The doctrine of alter ego
allows a court to pierce the corporate veil and impose on an
owner the obligations of its subsidiary when their conduct
demonstrates a virtual abandonment of separateness.”
Janvey v. Alguire, 847 F.3d 231, 242 (5th Cir. 2017)
(citing Bridas I, 345 F.3d 347, 359.) “The
alter ego doctrine, like all variations of piercing the
corporate veil doctrine, is reserved for exceptional
cases.” Bridas II, 447 F.3d 411, 416 (citing
In re Multiponics, Inc., 622 F.2d 709, 724-25 (5th
 In its proposed First Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff attempted to raise allegations of
fraudulent behavior that were unsupported by facts. In the
Ruling issued by Judge Wilder-Doomes (Doc. 53), it was
ordered that Plaintiff remove the allegations of fraud
against Barnett, as they were factually unsupportable.
Consequently, Plaintiff repackaged the allegations in its
original complaint against ...