United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Monroe Division
L. HAYES MAG. JUDGE.
G. JAMES UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
before the Court is R & L Builder Supply, Inc.'s
(“Builders Supply”) “Motion for New Trial,
or in the Alternative, for Relief under Rule 60 on the Issue
of ‘Past and Future Loss of Revenue from Anticipated
Expansion of Builders Supply'” (“Rule 54(b)
Motion”) [Doc. No. 323]. Properties moves the Court to
reconsider its May 17, 2017 Judgment [Doc. No. 321] granting
in part and denying in part motions for summary judgment
filed by Defendants Prewett Enterprises, Inc.
(“Prewett”); Hulcher Services, Inc.
(“Hulcher”); Union Pacific Railroad Co.
(“Union Pacific”); and College City Leasing, LLC;
Daniel Shackleford; Taylor Logistics, Inc.; Taylor Truck
Line, LLC; Taylor Consolidated, Inc. (collectively “the
Taylor Entities”) on claims by Builders Supply for past
and future loss of revenues from the anticipated expansion of
its business operations. The Court held that Builders
Supply's “evidence is too speculative to show net
losses it might have suffered by the delay in expansion and
loss of storage capacity, ” and, thus, as Builders
Supply “cannot establish the loss to a reasonable
degree of certainty, ” the Court granted the motions
for partial summary judgment in part. [Doc. No. 290');">290, p. 10');">p. 10].
However, the Court found that Builders Supply had raised a
genuine issue of material fact for trial whether it suffered
damages from the loss of sale of top soil, and, thus, this
extent, the Court denied the motions for partial summary
judgment. [Doc. No. 290');">290, pp. 11-12].
argues that the depositions of Builders Supply's
accountant, James Gowdy (“Gowdy”), and its
expert, Dr. Randolph Rice (“Rice”), were taken
after the motions for partial summary judgment were fully
briefed. He points to testimony from those depositions to
support his argument that the Court failed to take into
account that the expansion onto the Church Street property
would reduce the cost of goods sold because it would have
fostered greater bulk purchases, allowed greater access to
inventory in storage, and reduced damages to materials left
exposed in the elements.
15, 2017, Prewett filed a memorandum in opposition to the
pending motion. [Doc. No. 336]. The Taylor Entities joined in
Prewett's opposition. [Doc. No. 337]. Prewett responds
that there is no basis to amend the Court's Judgment
because the deponents' testimony relies on
“speculative, unsupported statements provided by
[Randle] McLarrin and counsel for Builders Supply.”
[Doc. No. 336, p. 3].
reply memorandum was filed.
Court has explained in previous rulings, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure do not recognize a motion for reconsideration
per se. Instead, a motion challenging a judgment or
order may be filed under Rules 54, 59, or 60. Rules 59 and 60
apply only to final judgments. Rule 54(b) provides that any
order “that adjudicates fewer than all the claims...
[among] all the parties... may be revised at any time before
the entry of a [final] judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).
“Under Rule 54[(b)], a district court has the inherent
procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an
interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be
sufficient.” Iturralde v. Shaw Grp., Inc., 512
F. App'x 430, 432 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Melancon
v. Texaco, Inc., 659 F.2d 551, 553 (5th Cir. 1981))
(citations omitted); see generally Moses H. Cone
Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12
n. 14 (1983) (holding that “virtually all interlocutory
orders may be altered or amended before final judgment if
sufficient cause is shown”). An “order granting
partial summary judgment [is] interlocutory, ” and,
therefore, the Court must “analyze the motion for
reconsideration under Rule 54(b) . . . instead of Rule 59(e),
which applies to final judgments.” Cabral v.
Brennan, 853 F.3d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 2017). Courts
evaluate motions to reconsider interlocutory orders under a
“less exacting” standard than Rule 59(e), but,
nevertheless, look to similar considerations for guidance.
See HBM Interests, LLC v. Chesapeake Louisiana, LP,
No. 12-1048, 2013 WL 3893989 (W.D. La. July 26, 2013)
(quoting Livingston Downs Racing Ass'n, Inc. v.
Jefferson Downs Corp., 259 F.Supp.2d 471, 475 (M.D. La.
2002)); Sw. Louisiana Hosp. Ass'n v. BASF Const.
Chemicals, LLC, No. 2:10-CV-902, 2013 WL
1858610 (W.D. La. Apr. 29, 2013) (quoting Livingston
Downs, 259 F.Supp.2d at 475). Therefore, in determining
whether to grant the motion, the Court evaluates whether
there are “manifest errors of law or fact upon which
judgment is based[, ]” whether “new
evidence” is available, whether there is a need
“to prevent manifest injustice, ” or whether
there has been “an intervening change in controlling
law.” HBM Interests, 2013 WL 3893989, at *1
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
case, the Court finds no basis to reconsider or rescind its
previous Ruling and Judgment. First, the Court would note
that Builders Supply had ample time prior to the issuance of
its Ruling and Judgment to supplement its memorandum and
evidence. Nevertheless, even if the delay in supplementation
is disregarded, the Court finds that the arguments and
evidence presented in the motion do not support amendment.
The Court understands Builders Supply's arguments that it
considered only whether Builders Supply's revenues would
have increased and did not consider that Builders
Supply's costs would have been decreased by expansion.
However, the evidence is part and parcel of the same
considerations. The Court did, in fact, consider several of
these arguments. The problem with Builders Supply's
arguments is the same: “Builders Supply cannot
establish the loss to a reasonable degree of certainty”
because its evidence is simply “too speculative.”
[Doc. No. 320, p. 10');">p. 10]. While Builders Supply has pointed to
numbers used by Gowdy and Rice, those numbers are still
without sufficient support to raise a genuine issue of
material fact for trial, for the very reasons detailed in the
Court's Ruling. Finally, to the extent that Gowdy relied
on a comparison of a $2 million dollar lumberyard in Mer
Rouge, Louisiana, to a $30 million dollar lumberyard does
provide the type of objective evidence necessary to raise a
genuine issue of material fact for trial or for the Court to
reconsider its prior Ruling. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that
the motion is DENIED.
The Court dismissed all claims by R
& L Properties of Oak Grove, LLC, see [Doc. No.
290');">290, p. 6], but that entity has not moved for
reconsideration, and, thus, the Court's dismissal ...