FROM THE FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF
CALCASIEU, NO. 24832-12 HONORABLE DAVID ALEXANDER RITCHIE,
Christine Tizzard Attorney at Law COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT: Mark Anthony Broussard
Foster DeRosier District Attorney, Fourteenth Judicial
District Court Elizabeth Brooks Hollins Karen C. McLellan
Jacob L. Johnson Cynthia Killingsworth Carla S. Sigler
Assistant District Attorneys COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: State of
composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Phyllis M. Keaty, and D.
Kent Savoie, Judges.
ELIZABETH A. PICKETT JUDGE
July 1, 1986, and September 6, 1988, the defendant, Mark
Anthony Broussard, who was a priest in Lake Charles,
Louisiana, had anal sexual intercourse with one of the altar
boys in the church. The victim, J.A., was between eleven and
twelve years old when the offenses occurred.
September 6, 1988, and July 1, 1991, the defendant fondled
the genitals of L.N., who was an altar boy. The defendant
performed oral sexual acts on the victim and caused the
victim to perform oral sexual acts. The defendant also had
anal intercourse with L.N. The victim was between ten and
thirteen years old when the offenses were committed.
defendant was indicted on August 9, 2012, with two counts of
aggravated rape, violations of La.R.S. 14:42, molestation of
a juvenile, a violation of La.R.S. 14:81.2, aggravated oral
sexual battery, a violation of La.R.S. 14:43.4, and oral
sexual battery, a violation of La.R.S. 14:43.3.
January 8, 2013, the defendant filed a "Motion to
Suppress Statement." A hearing on the motion was held on
April 24, 2013. The trial court took the motion under
advisement. On May 1, 2013, the trial court denied the
defendant's motion to suppress in open court with
March 7, 2013, the state filed a "Notice of Intent to
Introduce Evidence of Similar Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts."
On September 16, 2015, the state filed a "Supplement
Notice of Intent to Introduce Evidence of Similar Crimes,
Wrongs, or Acts." On September 13, 2013, the defendant
filed a "Motion in Limine" in response to the
state's filing of the notice of intent to introduce
similar crimes, wrongs, or acts at trial, seeking to include
that evidence. In response to the the defendant's motion
in limine, the state filed "State's
Response to the Defendant's Motion for Pretrial
Disclosure of Evidence of Independent and Separate Offenses,
Wrongs, or Acts and Pretrial Hearing, " and
"State's Response to the Defendant's Motion
in Limine." On June 25, 2015, the trial court
denied the defendant's motion in limine in open
September 13, 2013, the defendant also filed a "Motion
to Redact Videotaped Statement and to Prohibit Introduction
of or Reference to Crime not Subject to Indictment." The
state filed "State's Response to Defense Redactions
to Statement of the Accused." On January 25, 2016, the
morning trial commenced, the defendant, the state, and the
trial court addressed the defendant's motion to redact.
During the proceeding, the defendant objected to several of
the trial court's refusals to redact certain portions of
the defendant's videotaped statement to the police.
commenced on January 25, 2016, and on February 5, 2016, the
defendant was found guilty as charged. The defendant was
sentenced on March 11, 2016, to two life sentences at hard
labor, without the possibility of parole, probation, or
suspension of sentence on the convictions for aggravated
rape; fifteen years at hard labor on the conviction for
molestation of a juvenile; fifteen years at hard labor on the
conviction for oral sexual battery; and twenty-five years on
the conviction of aggravated oral sexual battery. All the
sentences were ordered to be served consecutively, with
credit for time served.
defendant filed a "Motion to Reconsider Sentence"
on April 8, 2016. The motion to reconsider the sentence was
denied without a hearing.
defendant has perfected a timely appeal, wherein he alleges
four assignments of error:
1. The court erred when it denied a challenge for cause of a
2. The court erred when it denied the motion to suppress
based on Defendant's invocation of right to counsel.
3. The court erred when it denied Defendant's motion
in limine to exclude other crimes evidence under
La.Code Evid. art. 404(B) in purview of La.Code Evid. art.
412.2, more particularly, evidence of the previously quashed
4. The court erred when it denied, in part, Defendant's
motion to redact the transcription of the videotaped
statement and to prohibit the introduction of or reference to
crimes not subject to indictment.
accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are
reviewed by this court for errors patent on the face of the
record. After reviewing the record, we find there are no
OF ERROR NUMBER ONE
defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied
his challenge for cause of a potential juror who had revealed
that she was raped as a child by two uncles. The defendant
argues that although the prospective juror indicated that she
could remain impartial, her responses during voir
dire showed bias, prejudice, or inability to render a
judgment according to the law.
State v. Lewis, 12-1021, pp. 9-11 (La. 3/19/13), 112
So.3d 796, 801-02 (footnote omitted), the supreme court
The peremptory challenge occupies an important role in the
jury selection process. By enabling each side to exclude
those jurors it perceives as harboring subtle biases with
regard to the case which were not elicited on voir dire or
which do not establish legal cause for a challenge,
peremptory challenges are a means of "
'eliminat[ing] extremes of partiality on both sides,
'. . .thereby 'assuring the selection of a qualified
and unbiased jury.' " Holland v. Illinois,
493 U.S. 474, 484, 110 S.Ct. 803, 107 L.Ed.2d 905 (1990),
quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219, 85
S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965) and Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69
(1986). While peremptory challenges are one means of assuring
the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury, the U.S.
Supreme Court has determined that an erroneous ruling denying
a peremptory challenge is not, as a matter of federal
constitutional law, a structural error requiring automatic
reversal of a defendant's conviction. Rivera v.
Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 160-61, 129 S.Ct. 1446, 173
L.Ed.2d 320 (2009). Rather, state law determines the
consequences when a peremptory challenge is erroneously
denied. Id. at 161-62, 129 S.Ct. 1446. As the Court
explained in Rivera, "[i]f a defendant is tried
before a qualified jury composed of individuals not
challengeable for cause, the loss of a peremptory challenge
due to a state court's good-faith error is not a matter
of federal constitutional concern . . . [but] a matter for
the State to address under its own laws." Id.
In Louisiana, the peremptory challenge is protected by and
preserved in the constitution. La. Const. art. I, § 17
("The accused shall have a right to full voir dire
examination of prospective jurors and to challenge jurors
peremptorily. The number of challenges shall be fixed by
law"). While the exercise of a peremptory challenge is
provided through legislation, La.C.Cr.P. arts. 795, 799, and
799.1, it is not merely a statutory right. Thus, this court
has long recognized that when a defendant is forced to
utilize a peremptory challenge to correct a district
court's error in denying a challenge for cause and
thereafter exercises all available peremptory challenges on
other prospective jurors, a substantial right of the
defendant, guaranteed by the Louisiana constitution, is
affected. State v. Monroe, 366 So.2d 1345, 1347
(La.1978). In such instances, prejudice is presumed.
Id.; State v. Juniors, 2003-2425, p. 8
(La.6/29/05), 915 So.2d 291, 305.
jurisprudence holds that trial courts have wide discretion in
determining whether to reject a juror for cause, and those
determinations cannot be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion. State v. Jones, 474 So.2d 919 (La.1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1178, 106 S.Ct. 2906 (1986).
A review of the record indicates that the defendant used all
twelve of his peremptory challenges prior to the full
complement of the jury. La.Code Crim.P. art. 799.1.
Accordingly, if the challenge for cause was wrongfully denied
in the current case, prejudice is presumed. See State v.
Blank, 04-204 (La. 4/11/07), 955 So.2d 90, cert.
denied, 552 U.S. 994, 128 S.Ct. 494 (2007).
third circuit case, State v. Hamilton, 12-204, pp.
4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/20/13), 127 So.3d 76, 79-80, writ
denied, 13-2925 (La. 5/30/14), 140 So.3d 1173, this
court discussed issues of a trial court's denial of
challenges for cause, as follows:
A trial court is vested with broad discretion in ruling on
challenges for cause, and its rulings will be reversed only
when a review of the entire voir dire reveals the trial judge
abused its discretion….
"A challenge for cause should be granted, even when a
prospective juror declares his ability to remain impartial,
if the juror's responses as a whole reveal facts from
which bias, prejudice or inability to render judgment
according to law may be reasonably implied." However, a
trial court does not abuse its discretion when it refuses to
excuse a prospective juror on the ground he is not impartial
where, after further inquiry or instruction, the potential
juror has demonstrated a willingness and ability to decide
the case impartially according to the law and evidence. Thus,
to establish reversible error warranting reversal of a
conviction and sentence, defendant must demonstrate "(1)
erroneous denial of a challenge for cause; and (2) the use of
all his peremptory challenges." In the instant case, it
is undisputed that defense counsel exhausted his peremptory
challenges, and, therefore, need only show that the trial
court abused its discretion by denying a challenge for cause.
State v. Odenbaugh, 10-268, pp. 23-25 (La.12/6/11),
82 So.3d 215, 236-37, cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 133
S.Ct. 410, 184 L.Ed.2d 51 (2012) (citations omitted).
to La.Code Crim.P. art. 797, the State or Defendant may
challenge a prospective juror for cause on the ground that:
(2) The juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his
partiality. An opinion or impression as to the guilt or
innocence of the defendant shall not of itself be sufficient
ground of challenge to a juror, if he declares, and the court
is satisfied, that he can render an impartial verdict
according to the law and the evidence;
(3) The relationship, whether by blood, marriage, employment,
friendship, or enmity between the juror and the defendant,
the person injured by the offense, the district attorney, or
defense counsel, is such that it is reasonable to conclude
that it would influence the juror in arriving at a verdict;
(4) The juror will not accept the law as given to him by the
Odenbaugh, 82 So.3d at 238 (citations omitted), the
supreme court further stated:
[W]hile cognizant of the broad discretion afforded a district
court when ruling on cause challenges, this Court has
cautioned that a prospective juror's responses cannot be
considered in isolation and that a challenge should be
granted, "even when a prospective juror declares his
ability to remain impartial, if the juror's responses as
a whole reveal facts from which bias, prejudice or inability
to render judgment according to law may be reasonably
the state's voir dire of the prospective juror,
the defense revealed that on the prospective juror's jury
questionnaire, A.D. stated that she had been raped by two of
her uncles when she was a child. In brief, the defendant
argues that her responses given during voir dire
indicated that she was angry "over her perceived lack of
justice that occurred when two uncles that purportedly raped
her over a number of years were not prosecuted."
state, defense counsel, and the trial court questioned the
juror away from the jury pool. The juror explained that both
she and her sister were raped by two of their uncles. She
stated that the sexual abuse stopped when she and her sister
complained to their mother. Even though a complaint was filed
and the two sisters' statements were taken, one uncle, as
soon as he was told of the accusations, fled the state. She
explained that her sister then refused to concur with the
accusation against the second uncle, and the matter was
dropped. The prospective juror told the trial court she
received extensive counseling that lasted for several years.
She insisted that she had moved on; she was married, had two
children, and worked full time. While she said she was mad
back then, "but now it's - - it's been so long
counsel questioned Ms. [A.D.], as follows:
MR. T. LORENZI: Ms. [A.D.], if you were in my position
knowing that I represent Mr. Broussard and knowing what
he's charged with, you've been here ...