United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Donald Pierce moves for reconsideration of the
Court's orderdenying his motion to continue discovery
deadlines. For the following reasons, Pierce's motion for
reconsideration is denied.
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides that an order that
adjudicates fewer than all the claims among all the parties
“may be revised at any time” before the entry of
a final judgment. As Rule 54 recognizes, a district court
“possesses the inherent procedural power to reconsider,
rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by
it to be sufficient.” Melancon v. Texaco,
Inc., 659 F.2d 551, 553 (5th Cir. 1981). Although the
district court's discretion in this regard is broad, it
is exercised sparingly in order to forestall the perpetual
reexamination of orders and the resulting burdens and delays.
See Calpetco 1981 v. Marshall Exploration, Inc., 989
F.2d 1408, 1414-15 (5th Cir. 1993)
general practice of this court has been to evaluate motions
to reconsider interlocutory orders under the same standards
that govern Rule 59(e) motions to alter or amend a final
judgment. See Hill v. New Orleans City, No. 13-2463,
2016 WL 4180809, at *8 (E.D. La. Aug. 8, 2016) (citing
Lightfoot v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 07-4833, 2012
WL 711842, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 5, 2012)). Although there may
be circumstances in which a different standard would be
appropriate, see, e.g., Am. Canoe Ass'n v.
Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 514-16 (4th Cir.
2003), the present motion does not present them. The proper
inquiry therefore is whether the moving party has
“clearly establish[ed] either a manifest error of law
or fact or . . . present[ed] newly discovered
evidence.” Ross v. Marshall, 426 F.3d 745, 763
(5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Simon v. United States, 891
F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990)). A motion to reconsider is
“not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal
theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised
before the entry of [the order].” Templet v.
HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478-79 (5th Cir. 2004).
The Court is mindful that “[r]econsideration of a
judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy that
should be used sparingly.” Id. at 479.
bases his motion on a single piece of purportedly new
evidence: a deposition taken on February 7, 2017 from Michael
Knight, a quality control manager with KBR. Pierce's
“new evidence” does not provide grounds for
reconsideration for two reasons. First, the evidence is not
new. The Court issued its order denying Pierce's
requested extension on February 24, 2017, more than two weeks
after the Knight deposition. To the extent Pierce argues that
the deposition is new evidence because it was taken after he
filed his motion, Pierce is wrong. The relevant date is when
the order is actually issued. See Matador Petroleum Corp.
v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 653, 658
n.1 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Matador's failure to explain
why the evidence was not available prior to the district
court's grant of summary judgment constitutes a valid
basis for denying Matador's Motion for
Reconsideration.”); Russ v. International Paper
Co., 943 F.2d 589, 593 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that
“the unexcused failure to present evidence [that] is
available at the time summary judgment is under consideration
constituted a valid basis for denying a motion to
reconsider”); see also 11 Wright & Miller,
Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2810.1 (3d ed.) (“The
Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to relitigate old matters,
or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have
been raised prior to the entry of judgment.”
even if the deposition were new evidence, it does nothing to
undermine the Court's previous order. Pierce asserts that
several “new document possibilities opened up”
after Knight's deposition. But that Pierce has identified
even more information that he would like to request does
nothing to undermine the Court's earlier order. As
explained there, Pierce has had ample opportunity to pursue
his claim under the existing discovery deadlines. In re
Complaint of C.F. Bean L.L.C., 841 F.3d 365, 378 (5th
Cir. 2016) (“adherence to scheduling orders is critical
in maintaining the integrity of judicial proceedings”
(modifications omitted)). Furthermore, Pierce offers no
explanation for why he did not depose Knight earlier, and
thereby give himself the time needed to conduct any follow-up
investigation before discovery deadlines expired. See
Marathon Fin. Ins., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 591 F.3d
458, 470 (5th Cir. 2009) (explaining that Rule 16(b)
“requires a party ‘to show that the deadlines
cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party
needing the extension.'” (quoting S&W
Enters., LLC v. Southtrust Bank of Ala., NA, 315 F.3d
533, 535 (5th Cir. 2003)).
Donald Pierce's motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
 R. Doc. 35.
 R. Doc. 27.
 R. Doc. 35-1 at 3.