APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT
ORLEANS PARISH NO. 503-161, SECTION "I" Honorable
Karen K. Herman, Judge
CANNIZZARO, KYLE DALY, COUNSEL FOR STATE OF
TAYLOR DEFENDANT/RELATOR/IN PROPER PERSON
composed of Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Madeleine M.
Landrieu, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins
CABRINA JENKINS JUDGE
Troy Taylor seeks supervisory review of the district
court's September 22, 2016 written judgment that denied
his pro se application for post-conviction relief.
At the direction of this court, the state filed a response to
Taylor's writ application. For the reasons that follow,
we grant the writ application, reverse the judgment of the
trial court denying Taylor's application for
post-conviction relief on his claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, and vacate Taylor's conviction and sentence
on the charge of forcible rape.
August 2011, Taylor was tried and convicted of the 1994
forcible rapeand second degree kidnapping of the victim,
S.B. Taylor had been identified as a suspect in 2008 after
the Combined DNA Index System ("CODIS") matched his
DNA with DNA taken from the victim. The district court
imposed concurrent terms of 40 years imprisonment at hard
labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of
sentence. On direct appeal, this court affirmed Taylor's
forcible rape conviction and sentence, but reversed his
conviction for second degree kidnapping, finding that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying Taylor's
motion to quash the kidnapping charge as untimely instituted.
State v. Taylor, 12-0345 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/26/13),
118 So.3d 65, writ denied, 13-1830 (La. 2/28/14),
134 So.3d 1169. On February 26, 2016, Taylor timely filed an
application for post-conviction relief, which the district
court denied in a judgment dated September 22, 2016. Taylor
filed his writ application in this court on December 7, 2016.
the grounds of Taylor's application for post-conviction
relief is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. This
claim relates to La. C.Cr.P. art. 572(B), which provides an
exception to the prescriptive period for prosecution of sex
offenses in which the offender's identity is established
through DNA testing.
La. C.Cr.P. art. 572 provides, in pertinent part:
A. Except as provided in Articles 571 and 571.1, no person
shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for an offense not
punishable by death or life imprisonment, unless the
prosecution is instituted within the following periods of
time after the offense has been committed:
(1) Six years, for a felony necessarily punishable by
imprisonment at hard labor. . . .
B. (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 571.1 and
Paragraph A of this Article, prosecutions for any sex offense
may be commenced beyond the time limitations set forth in
this Title if the identity of the offender is established
after the expiration of such time limitation through the use
of a DNA profile. . . .
(4) This Paragraph shall have retroactive application to
crimes committed prior to June 20, 2003.
argues that the retroactive application of La. C.Cr.P. art.
572(B) to revive his already prescribed forcible rape charge
violates the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the U.S. and Louisiana
Constitutions. According to Taylor, his attorney's
failure to move to quash the charge of forcible rape on ex
post facto grounds constituted ineffective ...