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Harriss v. Archives Grill, LLC

Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Second Circuit

April 5, 2017

J. GRANGER HARRISS, IV Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
ARCHIVES GRILL, LLC, JAMES KEEFER, SARAH EVE KEEFER, AND PATRICK D. BELL Defendants-Appellants

         Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Lower Court Case No. 550, 776 Honorable Michael Pitman, Judge

          JAMES KEEFER Appellant, In Proper Person.

          SARAH EVE KEEFER Appellant, In Proper Person.

          J. GRANGER HARRISS, IV Appellee, In Proper Person.

          Before WILLIAMS, DREW, and GARRETT, JJ.

          GARRETT, J.

         The defendants, James and Sarah Keefer, appeal from a trial court order denying their "Motion to Dismiss and Order to Stop Garnishment." For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court ruling.

         FACTS

         This case arose from a lease dispute between the plaintiff, J. Granger Harriss, IV, and the defendants, Archives Grill, LLC ("Grill"), James and Sarah Keefer, and Patrick D. Bell. The Grill executed a lease with Harriss for restaurant space in the Mid-City Plaza building ("MCP") in Shreveport. Harriss is the majority owner of MCP. The lease was to run from June 3, 2010, through November 30, 2012. The rent was $3, 000 per month, with a six-month abatement. It contained an acceleration clause in the event of a default. The Grill was to pay the gas and electricity bills. The Keefers operated the restaurant. They both signed a lease guaranty agreement for all the obligations under the lease on June 3, 2010.

         In February 2011, Mr. Keefer accepted a job with the Department of Defense ("DOD") that required him to move to Georgia. The Keefers talked with Harriss about getting out of the lease and having Bell take over. On April 30, 2011, Bell also signed a guaranty on the existing lease. The Keefers executed a promissory note for the payment of past-due rent. Although it appears that the parties discussed a possible agreement releasing the Keefers from their obligation under the guaranty, no final agreement was ever reached or signed. The Keefers left Shreveport and moved out of state. Bell did not pay the obligations under the lease. In May 2011, Harriss discovered that substantially all of the property had been removed from the space without giving notice of intent to vacate.

         On May 23, 2011, Harriss filed the instant suit against the Grill, the Keefers, and Bell, claiming they defaulted on the lease.[1] Harriss sought to collect past-due rent of $10, 999.96, and accelerated rent through the end of the term of $54, 000. He also claimed that a $540.95 electric bill was due. Pursuant to the guaranty agreements, Harriss sought judgments against the Keefers and Bell.

         The Grill failed to answer after being served with process through the Louisiana Secretary of State. With regard to the Keefers, Harriss proceeded against them pursuant to the provisions of the Louisiana long-arm statute, La. R.S. 13:3201 et seq.[2] On July 7, 2011, Harriss filed into the record the required affidavits of mailing of service of process to each of the Keefers through the long-arm statute. The citations and petitions were mailed to the Keefers at an address in Byron, Georgia. Harriss attested that the process was sent by United States certified mail, in envelopes properly addressed to the Keefers, with sufficient postage attached. The exhibits attached to the affidavits show that both certified mail notices were left at the Byron, Georgia, address on June 3, 2011. The envelopes were returned "unclaimed" on June 18, 2011.

         The Grill and the Keefers did not file an answer, and preliminary defaults were entered on August 15, 2011. A confirmation hearing was held in open court on August 22, 2011, before Judge Leon Emanuel. Harriss filed an affidavit in support of confirmation of default, detailing service of process on the Grill and his attempts to serve the Keefers at their address in Georgia. He noted the affidavits of mailing of long-arm service of process previously filed in the record. The lease, the lease guaranty, and itemization of court costs were included as an exhibit to the affidavit. Harriss obtained a default judgment against the Grill and the Keefers on that date, for $65, 901.65, costs of $360.74, and legal interest.[3] Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1913, the clerk of court mailed notices of the default judgment to the Keefers at the address in Byron, Georgia, on that same date.

         After the appeal delays ran, Harriss filed a petition to garnish Mr. Keefer's wages on October 6, 2011. On October 10, 2011, an order was signed making the judgment executory and the clerk of court was ordered to issue a writ of fieri facias. The DOD/Defense Finance and Accounting Service was made garnishee and ordered to answer interrogatories. On November 8, 2011, the DOD filed answers to the interrogatories. At some point, the DOD began sending the wage garnishment payments to the Caddo Parish Sheriff's Office ("CPSO"), pursuant to the court orders.

         The Keefers eventually secured the services of an attorney. On April 13, 2012, they filed a pleading in the existing suit record captioned as a "Motion for Rule to Show Cause, for New Trial, and to Stay or Set Aside the Judgment and Garnishment." They alleged that they never received service of process, and that the judgment against them was based on fraud or ill practices, misrepresentations to the court, and other unspecified acts or omissions. They alleged that the service was returned, not through any action on their part, but because it was not mailed to the current address they claimed to have furnished to Harriss.

         The Keefers also alleged they had an agreement with Harriss releasing them from any further obligation under the lease and detailed their version of what they thought had transpired. They asserted that Harriss had a dispute with Bell, and wrongfully sued them for breach of contract. They asked for a new trial, to set aside the garnishment, and to stay the garnishment, pending a hearing on their motions. The trial court did not sign the portion of the ex parte order they submitted to stop the garnishment. A rule to show cause on the motion was set for a hearing on June 11, 2012. A hearing was not held on that date. It appears that the Keefers did not obtain service upon Harriss. The matter lay dormant for several years. The DOD continued to remit the wage garnishment payments to CPSO.

         On January 9, 2015, the Keefers' attorney filed another pleading captioned "Amended Petition, " reiterating all of their prior claims and asserting cross-claims against Harriss and Bell for damages caused by the garnishment. According to the Keefers, Harriss and Bell had an agreement whereby Bell was substituted as guarantor on the lease and was made the member-manager of the Grill, releasing the Keefers from all obligations. The Keefers claimed that Harriss and Bell breached an agreement to indemnify and hold them harmless in the substitution of Bell on the lease. They asserted that the garnishment was obtained by fraud and ill practices and on insufficient grounds. They demanded a concursus proceeding to determine the ownership of the garnishment funds being held by the CPSO. They again requested a new trial and an injunction to stop the garnishment. Due to the retirement of Judge Emanuel, the case was assigned to Judge Michael Pitman. A hearing was set by the court for February 23, 2015, but was not held. It appears that the Keefers were unable to serve Harriss.

         The Keefers had a dispute with their attorney, dismissed him, and chose to represent themselves. On May 2, 2016, they filed a pleading entitled "Motion to Dismiss and Order to Stop Garnishment, " in which they asked that the court grant their "motion for summary judgment" pursuant to the "Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." They again sought dismissal of the default judgment and the garnishment based on their claim that they did not get service of the suit. They did not raise any complaints regarding the substance of the default judgment in their pleading. However, they attached numerous exhibits to their filing, outlining some negotiations for the substitution of Bell on the lease. They did not supply any documentation or proof that a final agreement was ever reached or signed by the parties. Some of the emails attached to the pleading actually indicate that the negotiations had broken down. The ex parte order submitted to the court, along with the inartful pleadings, were somewhat unintelligible. The order purported to grant relief without a court hearing and was not signed by the court. Instead, the court generated its own order which appropriately set the matter for a hearing.

         The trial court held a hearing on the Keefers' motions on June 13, 2016. The Keefers traveled to Shreveport and were present in court along with Harriss. Prior to the hearing, Harris filed a legal memorandum in opposition to the motions. The Keefers and Harriss argued their positions, but the parties were not sworn to testify.

         The Keefers argued that they were never served with process and that they had an agreement with Harriss to be relieved of the lease obligation. They claimed they did not receive a copy of the default judgment and only became aware of the judgment when Mr. Keefer's wages were garnished.[4]They outlined all of their attempts to attack the default judgment through the efforts of their attorney and claimed that he did not perform satisfactorily in representing their interests. Curiously, they submitted an affidavit from Bell which denied that the Keefers were released from any agreement they had with Harriss or that Bell agreed to meet the Keefers' obligations.[5]

         Harriss pointed out that a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment were not proper procedural devices considering the posture of this case. He argued that a motion for new trial would be an appropriate method to attack the default judgment. However, since the Keefers failed to file that motion within seven days of the mailing of the notice of the default judgment, as required by law, it was untimely. Harriss also maintained that he complied with all the requirements for entry of a valid default judgment and for service of process under the long-arm statute. He noted that the certified letters came back "unclaimed." He argued this did not mean the notices did not reach the recipients. Rather, it meant that the notices for the certified mail were left at the address and the Keefers did not go pick up the certified mail from the post office. Harriss pointed to jurisprudence holding that the parties cannot defeat service under the long-arm statute by failing to claim the letters.[6] He introduced into evidence proof that he also utilized the services of a commercial courier to make delivery of the process to the Keefers at the Byron, Georgia, address, which is another method of service provided for under the long-arm statute. See La. R.S. 13:3204 and 3205. The package was returned on June 15, 2011, with a notation, "RECEIVER DID NOT ORDER, REFUSED." Harriss also presented the testimony of the MCP property manager, Ms. Emery, who stated that there was no agreement to release the Keefers from their obligations under the lease.

         The trial court found that the Keefers' reference to a motion for summary judgment was misplaced because that is a pretrial procedure, and they were seeking to overturn a default judgment. The trial court construed the Keefers' most recent pleading as a motion for new trial and a motion to dismiss and stop the garnishment. The court noted that a motion for new trial must be filed within seven days of the judgment, and pointed out that the first motion for new trial was filed by the Keefers' attorney in April 2012, some eight months after the default judgment, and the latest motion for new trial was filed by the Keefers, in proper person, in 2016, more than four years after the judgment. The motion for new trial was denied as untimely. The requests for ...


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