United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Lafayette Division
BY
CONSENT OF THE PARTIES
MEMORANDUM RULING
PATRICK J HANNA, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Currently
pending is defendant Employers Mutual Casualty Company's
motion for summary judgment. (Rec. Doc. 40). The motion is
opposed, and oral argument was held on March 23, 2017.
Considering the evidence, the law, and the arguments of the
parties, and for the reasons fully explained below, the
motion is denied.
Background
The
plaintiff alleged in her petition that she was injured in a
motor vehicle accident that occurred on July 17, 2014 at the
intersection of Willow Street and the Evangeline Throughway
in Lafayette, Louisiana. She further alleged that, as she was
traveling east on Willow, defendant James Allen Thornton,
Jr., made an improper left turn from the westbound lane of
Willow, causing the accident. The plaintiff alleged that
Thornton was in the course and scope of his employment with
defendant Franklin Homes, Inc., at the time of the accident
and that Franklin is insured by defendant Employers Mutual
Casualty Company. After the accident, Thornton died, and
Franklin sought bankruptcy protection. Therefore, Employers
Mutual is the only remaining defendant.[1] In the pending
motion, Employers Mutual seeks to be absolved of liability
for causing the accident.
Analysis
A.
The Summary Judgment Standard
Under
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary
judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. A fact is material if proof of
its existence or nonexistence might affect the outcome of the
lawsuit under the applicable governing law.[2] A genuine issue
of material fact exists if a reasonable jury could render a
verdict for the nonmoving party.[3]
The
party seeking summary judgment has the initial responsibility
of informing the court of the basis for its motion and
identifying those parts of the record that demonstrate the
absence of genuine issues of material fact.[4] If the moving
party carries its initial burden, the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a genuine
issue of a material fact.[5] All facts and inferences are construed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.[6]
If the
dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will
bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may
satisfy its burden by pointing out that there is insufficient
proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving
party's claim.[7] The motion should be granted if the
nonmoving party cannot produce evidence to support an
essential element of its claim.[8]
In this
case, subject-matter jurisdiction is based on diversity of
citizenship, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Accordingly, this
Court must apply Louisiana's substantive
law.[9]
B.
Disputed Factual Issues Preclude Summary judgment
in Employers Mutual's
Favor
In
support of its motion for summary judgment, Employers Mutual
argued that the evidence concerning the parties'
respective fault for causing the accident is in equipoise,
mandating a ruling that the plaintiff cannot prove her case
and entitling Employers Mutual to summary judgment in its
favor. This argument rests on Employers Mutual's
contention that both drivers claim to have had a green light
at the time of the accident.
In
support of its theory, Employers Mutual presented its
responses to written discovery, in which it stated that its
internal investigation “revealed that the sole cause of
the accident was Shantell Alexander running a red
light.” (Rec. Doc. 40-5 at 2). Employers Mutual
presented no evidence that the light controlling the
plaintiff's travel lane was actually red at the time of
the accident. Employers Mutual seems to assume that the
plaintiff's light was red because the defendant driver
said in a recorded statement that his light was green. Such
an assumption has no evidentiary value at this stage of the
proceedings.
Employers
Mutual also submitted the affidavit of Todd Riplie, a claims
adjuster, who stated that he investigated the accident and
was unable to identify any witnesses or obtain any video
footage depicting the accident. (Rec. Doc. 40-6).
Riplie
also stated in the affidavit that he took a statement from
Thornton in which Thornton stated that the left turn arrow
was green when he made the left turn. (Rec. Doc. 40-6).
Riplie also stated that a copy of “the crash
report” was attached to the affidavit. (Rec. Doc.
40-6). It is not clear what “crash report” Riplie
is referring to, and there is nothing attached to
Riplie's affidavit. Employers Mutual argued that the
investigating police officer did not issue a citation because
both drivers told him they had a green light, and he could
locate no witnesses to the accident. No evidence was
presented in support of that argument; and there was no
testimony of any kind from an investigating officer submitted
along with the motion.
Employers
Mutual also submitted the affidavit of Kelly Reily (Rec. Doc.
40-7), who stated that she transcribed a recorded statement
obtained from Thornton. There is no evidence that the
statement was sworn or that Thornton was cautioned with
regard to perjury before making the statement, and therefore,
its status as competent summary judgment evidence is
questionable. However, evan assuming it can and should be
considered, it does not carry the day for the defendant. The
transcript of Thornton's statement is attached to
Reily's affidavit, and Employers Mutual used the
...