United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Monroe Division
L. HAYES MAG. JUDGE.
G. JAMES UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Misty Byrd (“Byrd”), a former employee of
Louisiana Tech University, brought this action against the
Board of Supervisors for the University of Louisiana System
d/b/a Louisiana Tech University (“Tech”) under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e, et seq. Tech filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 56], contending that Byrd is not
entitled to recover damages for her alleged loss of health
and dental insurance, employer contributions to the state
employees' retirement system, or miscellaneous fringe
benefits. Byrd filed a memorandum in opposition to Tech's
motion. [Doc. No. 60]. Tech filed a reply memorandum. [Doc.
following reasons, the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
was an employee of Tech between 2003 and April 30, 2012, the
effective date of her termination. She was hired by and
worked under the supervision of her former step-father, Dr.
Glen Beer (“Beer”). Byrd contends that Beer
sexually harassed her until 2012. She contends further that
her termination was a culmination of the harassment and/or
retaliation in violation of Title VII. At the time of her
termination, Byrd was an office manager in the College of
Education. Byrd alleges that she attempted to report the
alleged harassment to David Gullatt, Dean of the College of
Education, but she claims he refused to listen. Tech contends
that Byrd was terminated by Dean Gullatt after she was
involved in two incidents with a Kinesiology professor, Tammy
Schilling. Tech further contends that it was unaware of
Beer's alleged harassment of Byrd until she made a report
to the Human Resources Department on April 26, 2012, after
she had been informed that she was being terminated.
receiving her notice of right to sue from the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), Byrd
filed a Complaint [Doc. No. 1] in this Court on September 25,
2014. In the Complaint, Byrd alleges that “[s]he has
suffered loss of income, past and future, lost her health and
dental insurance as well as employer contributions in the
state employee's retirement system, causing her great
economic damage.” Id. at ¶13. In her
prayer for relief, Byrd seeks “judgment . . . in a sum
reasonable in the premises, estimated to be $750, 000.00 to
compensate her for her lost wages, past and future, lost
retirement income to compensate her for her emotional
distress, pain and suffering, reinstatement to a position
similar in nature to her previous employment together with
all costs of these proceedings and judicial interest from
date of judicial demand.” Id. at ¶ 14.
January 4, 2017, Tech filed the instant motion. On January
30, 2017, Byrd filed an opposition memorandum. On February
13, 2017, Tech filed a reply memorandum.
March 6, 2017, Tech also filed a pretrial memorandum. [Doc.
the instant motion was discussed with Magistrate Judge Hayes
at the pre-trial conference on March 8, 2017.
Court is now prepared to rule.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Motions for Summary Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), “[a] party may
move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or
defense--or the part of each claim or defense--on which
summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” The moving party bears
the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for
its motion by identifying portions of the record which
highlight the absence of genuine issues of material fact.
Topalian v. Ehrmann, 954 F.2d 1125, 1132 (5th Cir.
1992); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (“A
party asserting that a fact cannot be . . . disputed must
support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of
materials in the record . . .). A fact is
“material” if proof of its existence or
nonexistence would affect the outcome of the lawsuit under