United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
GIZELLE ROSS, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE MINOR CHILD, JAHIRES JAMES
USA FOOTBALL, INC., ET AL.
ORDER AND REASONS
L. C. FELDMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the Court is the plaintiff's motion to remand. For the
following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.
personal injury lawsuit involves a minor child.
James, a child, attended a football camp sponsored by USA
Football, Inc. One of the coaches at the camp allegedly
parked his personal vehicle near one of the end zones of the
football field used at the camp. While participating in the
camp, the plaintiff attempted to catch a pass and ran into
the vehicle that one of the coaches had allegedly negligently
child's mother, Gizelle Ross, sued the vehicle's
owner, whose name is still unknown but whom the plaintiff
speculates is likely a Louisiana domiciliary, and the vehicle
owner's insurer. Additionally, the plaintiff named USA
Football, Inc., the owner of the football camp program, and
its insurer, Chubb National Insurance Company, as defendants.
minor suffered cervical and lumbar spine sprain and full
disability, as well as lacerations to his arms. The plaintiff
seeks damages for past, present, and future medical and
medication expenses, past, present and future pain and
suffering, psychiatric and psychological damage and emotional
Football, Inc. removed the plaintiff's state court
lawsuit to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. The
plaintiff now moves the Court to remand the lawsuit to state
court, contending that Chubb did not consent to removal as
required under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A).
defendant may remove an action from state court to federal
court, provided the action is one in which the federal court
may exercise original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a);
Manguno v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co.,
276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002). The removing defendant
bears the burden of ensuring compliance with the procedural
requirements of removal. Manguno, 276 F.3d at 723.
The removal statutes are strictly construed in favor of
Fifth Circuit has long held that all properly joined and
served defendants must join in the notice of removal or
otherwise consent to removal within the 30 day period set
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Getty Oil Corp., Div.
of Texaco, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 841
F.2d 1254, 1262 (5th Cir. 1988); Brown v. Demco,
Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1986); Davis v.
City of Shreveport Police Dept., No. 12-0918, 2012 WL
4189511, *2 (W.D. La. Sept. 18, 2012). While each defendant
need not sign the notice of removal, there must be
“some timely filed written indication from each served
defendant, or from some person or entity purporting to
formally act on its behalf in this respect and to have the
authority to do so, that it has actually consented to such
action.” Gillis v. Louisiana, 294 F.3d 755,
759 (5th Cir. 2002). While some circuits dispute when the
30-day period for consent begins to run in cases involving
multiple defendants, the Fifth Circuit has made it clear that
all served defendants must join in or consent to removal
within thirty days after the first defendant is served.
Getty Oil, 841 F.2d at 1263. “Failure to
comply with the thirty-day time limitation or with the
unanimity requirement renders the removal procedurally
defective.” Jones v. Scogin, 929 F.Supp. 987,
988 (W.D. La. 1996).
issue before the Court is whether Chubb's consent to
removal, given to USA Football within 30 days of USA Football
being served, but filed into the record more than 30 days
after its service, is defective. Aside from establishing that
the 30-day time frame runs from when the first defendant is
served, the Fifth Circuit also makes it clear that the
removing defendant must do more than merely state that
another served defendant consents to removal in its notice of
removal filed in federal court. Getty Oil, ...