United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Shreveport Division
HORNSBY MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MAURICE HICKS, JR.UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is Petitioner Paula Bradford Gines'
(“Gines”) Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct
Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Record Document 118).
Gines seeks to have her sentence corrected on the grounds
that the Government breached its obligations under her plea
agreement and ineffective assistance of counsel. For the
reasons discussed herein, Gines' Motion is
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
27, 2011, a federal grand jury filed charges against Gines
and Mario Hublin (“Hublin”) in a six-count
indictment, alleging that Gines and Hublin had engaged in a
conspiracy to obtain monies, funds, and property to which
they were not entitled. See Record Doucment 1. The
indictment alleged that Gines and Hublin had defrauded
Time-It-Lube in Shreveport, Louisiana, by stealing credit
card convenience checks and other materials from
Time-It-Lube's mailbox and using the information
contained therein to defraud Time-It-Lube out of several
thousand dollars. See id.
her arrest and a period of detention, she was released on a
$25, 000 unsecured bond. See Record Document 35.
However, she violated the terms of her release pending trial,
and a warrant for her arrest was issued on January 24, 2012.
See Record Documents 60-62. She was finally
re-arrested on October 2, 2012. See Record Document
75. On October 31, 2012, Gines pleaded guilty to Count Six of
the indictment, Unauthorized Use of Counterfeit Securities.
See Record Document 86. On March 8, 2012, the Court
sentenced her to 24 months' imprisonment and three years
of supervised release. See Record Document 104. On
January 29, 2014, Gines filed the instant § 2255 Motion.
See Record Document 118.
Motions to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct a Sentence Under 28
U.S.C. § 2255
federal habeas corpus remedy is contained in 28 U.S.C. §
2255, which provides that a prisoner serving a federal
sentence may make a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct
his sentence within a year after his conviction has become
final. Review under § 2255 is limited to four grounds:
(1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution
or laws of the United States; (2) the court was without
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence exceeds
the statutory maximum sentence; or (4) the sentence is
otherwise subject to collateral attack. See 28
U.S.C. § 2255. However, after conviction and exhaustion
of a defendant's right to appeal, the Court is
“entitled to presume that the defendant stands fairly
and finally convicted.” United States v.
Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, 231-32 (5th Cir. 1991), quoting
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164 (1982).
According to the Supreme Court, “our trial and
appellate procedures are not so unreliable that we may not
afford their completed operation any binding effect beyond
the next in a series of endless postconviction collateral
attacks . . . to the contrary, a final judgment commands
respect.” Frady, 456 U.S. at 164-65.
issues that can be presented in a motion filed under 28
U.S.C.b § 2255 are limited. A defendant can challenge a
final conviction only on issues of constitutional or
jurisdictional magnitude. Shaid, 937 F.2d at 232. As
the Fifth Circuit has stated:
Relief under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 is reserved for
transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow
range of injuries that could not have been raised on direct
appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete
miscarriage of justice. Nonconstitutional claims that could
have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, may not be
asserted in a collateral proceeding.
United States v. Vaughn, 955 F.2d 367, 368 (5th Cir.
1992) (citations omitted).
a petitioner wishes to assert issues that are constitutional
or jurisdictional in nature, he may be procedurally barred
from raising them. In order to raise an issue for the first
time on collateral review, a petitioner must show both
“cause” for his procedural default and
“actual prejudice” resulting from the error.
Frady, 456 U.S. at 168; Shaid, 937 F.2d at
232. To establish “cause, ” defendant must show
that some external impediment prevented him from raising the
claim on direct appeal. See United States v. Flores,
981 F.2d 231, 235 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying the same
“cause” standard to a prisoner's second
§ 2255 motion). In order to meet the “actual
prejudice” test, he must ...