United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana
DAVID MCMILLAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF HIS MINOR CHILDREN, KATELYNN ELIZABETH, BRIANNA LYNNE, SOPHIA LORENA, AND QUILLAN DAVID MCMILLAN, ET AL.
J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., ET AL.
RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Answers to
Discovery (R. Doc. 32) filed on December 5, 2016. The motion
is opposed. (R. Doc. 45). Plaintiffs have filed a Reply. (R.
Court set November 28, 2016 as the final deadline to complete
all discovery and to file related motions. (R. Doc. 24).
Plaintiffs seek an order requiring Chase to provide
supplemental responses to Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 3
and No. 16 served on October 28, 2016, and to which Chase
responded on November 28, 2016. The instant motion was timely
filed because it was “filed within seven days after the
discovery deadline and pertain to conduct occurring during
the final seven days of discovery.” LR 26(g).
preliminary issue, Chase argues that the Motion to Compel
should be denied because the underlying interrogatories were
untimely served. Rule 33(b)(2) provides that a
“responding party must serve its answers and any
objections within 30 days after being served with the
interrogatories.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(b)(2). There is no
dispute that Plaintiffs served the interrogatories by e-mail
on October 28, 2016. (R. Doc. 32-1 at 1; see R. Doc.
33-2). Pursuant to the methods of calculating time provided
by Rule 6(a), Chase's responses would be due on November
28, 2016. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a). At the time the
interrogatories were served, however, Rule 6(d) provided that
“[w]hen a party may or must act within a specified time
after service and service is made under Rule 5(b)(2)(C), (D),
(E), or (F), 3 days are added after the period would
otherwise expire under Rule 6(a).” Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d)
(prior version). Service by e-mail constitutes service by
“electronic means” pursuant to Rule 5(b)(2)(E).
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(E). Accordingly, Chase
was provided an additional 3 days to provide responses to the
interrogatories, making them due on December 1,
Court's Local Rules provides that “[w]ritten
discovery is not timely unless the response to that discovery
would be due before the discovery deadline” and
“[t]he responding party has no obligation to respond
and object to written discovery if the response and objection
would not be due until after the discovery deadline.”
LR 26(d)(2). This Court has expressly held that discovery
requests served prior to the discovery deadline that require
compliance after the discovery deadline are untimely.
See, e.g., Hall v. State of
Louisiana, No. 12-657, 2014 WL at 2560715, at *1 (M.D.
La. June 6, 2014) (discovery requests served on party 14 days
before discovery deadline were untimely as the party had 30
days to respond to such discovery requests); see also
Sandifer v. Hoyt Archery, Inc., No. 12-322, 2015 WL
3465923, at *2 (M.D. La. June 1, 2015) (“Although it
was served 4 days before the expert discovery deadline, the
subpoena was untimely as it required compliance outside of
the March 31, 2015 deadline.”); Dixon v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., No. 13-179, 2014 WL 6474355, at *3 (M.D.
La. Nov. 19, 2014) (“Although it was served 6 days
before the expert discovery deadline, the subpoena was
untimely as it required compliance outside of the September
2, 2014 deadline.”).
have denied motions to compel discovery responses where the
discovery requests were untimely served in light of the 3
additional days to respond provided by Rule 6(d).
See, e.g., Nesselrotte v. Allegheny
Energy, Inc., No. 06-01390, 2008 WL 1925107, at *2 (W.D.
Pa. Apr. 30, 2008) (denying motion to compel because
discovery requests were not timely served when additional 3
days provided by Rule 6(d) were taken into consideration);
Gott v. The Raymond Corp., No. 07-145, 2008 WL
4911879, at *2 (N.D.W.Va. Nov. 14, 2008) (same); c.f.
Lykins v. CertainTeed Corp., No. 11-2133, 2012 WL
3578911, at *2-3 (D. Kan. Aug. 17, 2012) (discovery requests
were untimely when additional 3 days provided by Rule 6(d)
were taken into consideration, but excusing the
reviewed the applicable law and the particular facts of this
case, the Court will deny the motion to compel on the basis
that the interrogatories were untimely served. Chase had no
obligation to respond and object to the interrogatories
because its responses and objections were not due until after
the discovery deadline. See LR 26(d)(2). That Chase
provided certain responses to the interrogatories on November
28, 2016 does not change this analysis. Because the
interrogatories were untimely served, and Plaintiff did not
seek an extension of the deadline to complete discovery prior
to the close of discovery, Chase did not have a duty to
respond to the interrogatories at all. The Court will not
require a party to supplement discovery responses where the
initial responses were not required in the first place.
Moreover, the Court finds no basis to excuse Plaintiffs
failure to serve timely the underlying interrogatories. To do
so would undermine the computation rules provided by Rule 6,
Local Rule 26(d)(2), and this Court's Scheduling Order,
the Court reached the merits of the instant motion, it would
be denied on the basis that the interrogatories seek
information outside of the scope of discovery as they are
overly broad as written.
No. 3 requests “the name, social security number (if
known), last known address, last known telephone number, and
name and address of last known employer, of each and every
person employed for a period of more than one month at the
2828 Monterrey Blvd. Chase Branch from the time of July 17,
2015 and ten years prior.” (R. Doc. 32-2 at 6).
Plaintiffs represent that Chase objected on the basis that
the interrogatory is “overly broad, unduly burdensome,
and unlikely to lead to the discovery of relevant
information.” (R. Doc. 32-1 at 2). Subject to those
objections, Chase provided the name of the branch manager and
assistant branch manager at the time of the incident, further
indicating that those individuals are no longer employed by
Chase. (R. Doc. 32-1 at 2). Plaintiffs do not raise any
convincing argument that the names and contact information of
every employee who worked over one month at the Chase Bank at
issue for ten years prior to the incident fall within the
scope of discovery. The Court agrees with Chase that
Interrogatory No. 3, as written, is overly
No. 16 requests Chase to “state whether [Chase has] in
the past been sued for the condition of any property that
[Chase owns or rents] in the Baton Rouge area” and, if
so, to provide “the dates that suits were filed and the
parties to that suit.” (R. Doc. 32-2 at 9). Plaintiffs
represent that Chase objected on the basis that the
interrogatory is “overly broad, unduly burdensome, and
unlikely to lead to the discovery of relevant
information.” (R. Doc. 32-1 at 2). Subject to those
objections, Chase provided that “[n]o other lawsuits
have been filed concerning the Monterrey Branch, which is the
location of this incident.” (R. Doc. 32-1 at 2).
Plaintiffs do not raise any convincing argument that
information regarding lawsuits involving all properties owned
or rented by Chase in the Baton Rouge area without any limit
in time falls within the scope of discovery. The Court agrees
with Chase that Interrogatory No. 16 is overly
on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion
to Compel Answers to Discovery (R. Doc. 32) is DENIED. The
parties shall bear their own costs.
 Counting 30 days from the date of
service would require a response to be provided on November
27, 2016, a Sunday. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
6(a)(1)(A)-(B). Accordingly, the response date would continue
to run until the end of the next business day, ...