United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Monroe Division
L. HAYES MAG. JUDGE.
G. JAMES UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
before the Court is a “Motion for Judgment as a Matter
of Law Fed. R. 50(b) or Motion to Vacate or Alter Judgment
Fed. R. 60(b)(2)(6)” filed by Plaintiff Archie Johnson
(“Johnson”) [Doc. No. 37]. Johnson moves the
Court to reconsider its Ruling denying his Motion for Summary
Judgment. Id. at 3. Johnson argues that he has newly
discovered evidence of a different interpretation of the
applicable disturbing the peace statute found in Harris v
City of Bastrop, 3:15-cv-761 (W.D. La. 2016).
Id. Relying on his newly discovered case law,
Johnson argues that there are no longer any genuine disputes
of material facts. Id.
December 6, 2016, the Court issued a Ruling and Judgment on
the parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment in the
above-captioned case. [Doc. No. 27 & 28]. Johnson's
Motion for Summary Judgment was denied as to his claim for
false arrest and retaliation because there exist
“genuine issues as to the material facts as to the
basis of probable cause to arrest Johnson for Disturbing the
Peace . . . .” [Doc. No. 27, p. 7].
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize a motion
for reconsideration per se. Instead, a motion challenging a
judgment or order may be filed under Rules 54, 59, or 60.
Rules 59 and 60 apply only to final judgments. Likewise, a
Rule 50 motion is more appropriately raised after a party has
been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial.
54(b) provides that any order “that adjudicates fewer
than all the claims . . . [among] all the parties . . . may
be revised at any time before the entry of a [final]
judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). “Under Rule
54[(b)], a district court has the inherent procedural power
to reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for
cause seen by it to be sufficient.” Iturralde v.
Shaw Grp., Inc., 512 F. App'x 430, 432 (5th Cir.
2013) (quoting Melancon v. Texaco, Inc., 659 F2.d
551, 553 (5th Cir. 1981)) (citations omitted); see also
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 12 n. 14 (1983) (holding that “virtually
all interlocutory orders may be altered or amended before
final judgment if sufficient cause is shown”). Courts
evaluate motions to reconsider interlocutory orders under a
“less exacting” standard than Rule 59(e), but,
nevertheless, look to similar considerations for guidance.
See HBM Interests, LLC v. Chesapeake Louisiana, LP,
No. 12-1048, 2013 WL 3893989 (W.D. La. July 26, 2013)
(quoting Livingston Downs Racing Ass'n, Inc. v.
Jefferson Downs Corp., 259 F.Supp.2d 471, 475 (M.D. La.
2002)); Sw. Louisiana Hosp. Ass'n v. BASF Const.
Chemicals, LLC, No. 2:10-CV-902, 2013 WL 1858610 (W.D.
La. Apr. 29, 2013) (quoting Livingston Downs, 259
F.Supp.2d at 475). Therefore, in determining whether to grant
the motion, the Court must evaluate whether there are
“manifest errors of law or fact upon which judgment is
based[, ]” whether “new evidence” is
available, whether there is a need “to prevent manifest
injustice, ” or whether there has been “an
intervening change in controlling law.” HBM
Interests, 2013 WL 3893989, at *1 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
case, the Court finds no basis to reconsider or rescind its
previous Ruling and Judgment.
Johnson does not have any newly discovered evidence. He has
cited the Court to case law that was previously available to
him and does not constitute an intervening change in
Johnson's cited case law does not alter the outcome of
the Ruling and Judgment concerning his Motion for Summary
Judgment. The Court used the same analysis of the Disturbing
the Peace statute, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:103, in its
Ruling in this case as it did in Harris v. City of
Bastrop, 3:15-cv-761, [Doc. No. 20, p. 19]. The Court
reached the same conclusion in both cases, that issues of
material fact existed as to whether the Disturbing the Peace
statute was violated. At this stage of the litigation,
whether Johnson violated the ...