United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
ORDER AND REASONS
ANN VIAL LEMMON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
filed by defendant, Prime Property & Casualty Insurance,
Inc. (Doc. #41), is GRANTED, and the claim made against it by
plaintiff, Fouad Cherkaoui, is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
defendant, Inland Lease & Rental, Inc. (Doc. #42), is
GRANTED, and the claim made against it by plaintiff, Fouad
Cherkaoui, is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
matter is before the court on a motion for partial summary
judgment filed by defendant, Prime Property & Casualty
Insurance, Inc. This matter is also before the court on a
motion for summary judgment filed by defendant, Inland Lease
and Rental, Inc.
Fouad Cherkaoui, filed this action against defendants, J.A.
Benoit Pinel, Artisan Freight, LLC, Inland, and Prime seeking
damages for injuries that he allegedly sustained in an
automobile accident that occurred on May 16, 2015, on
Interstate 10 in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. Cherkaoui
alleges that Pinel, who was employed by Artisan and driving a
2015 Kenilworth T680 truck, collided into the rear
driver's side of Cherkaoui's vehicle, which caused
Cherkaoui's vehicle to spin off of the roadway. Inland
owned the 2015 Kenilworth T680, and leased it to PACCAR,
which in turn leased it to Artisan, as a replacement vehicle
for one that was earlier leased to Artisan by PACCAR Leasing
Corp. Cherkaoui's claims include property damage, past
and future lost wages, medical expense and loss of future
earning capacity. Cherkaoui alleges diversity subject matter
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
issued an automobile insurance policy to Artisan. Cherkaoui
alleged that the 2015 Kenilworth T680 was covered under that
policy. Inland filed a cross claim against Artisan and Prime
alleging that the lease agreement required Artisan to
purchase insurance to cover the leased vehicle, which
included Inland as an additional insured, and to indemnify
Inland for any claims made against it arising out of
Artisan's operation of the leased vehicle. Inland alleged
that Prime and Artisan owe Inland defense and indemnity as to
filed a motion for partial summary judgment on Inland's
cross claim arguing that it does not owe defense and
indemnity to Inland because the 2015 Kenilworth T680 was not
listed as a covered auto and is not an insured under the
policy. The court granted Prime's motion and dismissed
Inland's cross claim against Prime, finding that the 2015
Kenilworth T680 was not covered by the terms of the insurance
policy. See Rec. Doc. #40.
Prime filed the instant motion for partial summary judgment
seeking dismissal of Cherkaoui's claim against it under
Louisiana's Direct Action Statute arguing that Cherkaoui
cannot maintain that claim because this court has already
found that the 2015 Kenilworth T680 was not covered by the
insurance policy. Cherkaoui agrees that this court has found
that the vehicle was not covered by the Prime policy, but
argues that his claim against Prime should not be dismissed
because Prime may by liable to him under the MCS-90
argues that summary judgment should be granted on
Cherkaoui's claim against it because it did not
negligently entrust the vehicle to PACCAR. Cherkaoui argues
that Inland is not entitled to summary judgment because there
is a genuine issue of material fact regarding Inland's
insurance coverage for the 2015 Kenilworth T680.
Specifically, Cherkaoui seeks to discover whether Inland had
an insurance policy that may have covered Artisan or included
a MCS-90 endorsement.
Summary Judgment Standard
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the
"court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Granting a motion for summary judgment is proper if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
admissions on file, and affidavits filed in support of the
motion demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10 (1986). The
court must find "[a] factual dispute . . . [to be]
'genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party . . .
[and a] fact . . . [to be] ...