In the Matter of: DANIEL LEE RITZ, JR., also known as Bo Ritz, Debtor; HUSKY INTERNATIONAL ELECTRONICS, INCORPORATED, Appellant
DANIEL LEE RITZ, JR., Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
For HUSKY INTERNATIONAL ELECTRONICS, INCORPORATED, Appellant: Jeffrey Lee Dorrell, Hanszen & Laporte, Houston, TX.
For DANIEL L. RITZ, JR., Appellee: William D. Weber, Esq., Weber Law Firm, P.C., Houston, TX.
Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and KING and ELROD, Circuit Judges.
KING, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Husky International Electronics, Inc., brought this adversary proceeding against Appellee and debtor Daniel Lee Ritz, Jr., objecting to the discharge of a $163,999.38 contractual debt owed to Husky by Chrysalis Manufacturing Corp.--of which Ritz was a shareholder. Husky sought to except the debt from discharge under either 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) or 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The bankruptcy court denied all relief sought by Husky, determining that the debt was dischargeable. The district court affirmed on appeal. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The facts underlying this adversary proceeding are straightforward. Appellant Husky International Electronics, Inc. (" Husky" ), is a Colorado-based seller of electronic device components. From 2003 to 2007, Husky sold and delivered goods to Chrysalis Manufacturing Corp. (" Chrysalis" ) pursuant to a written contract. It is undisputed that Chrysalis failed to pay for all of the goods it purchased from Husky, and that Chrysalis owed a debt to Husky in the amount of $163,999.38. At all relevant times, Appellee Daniel Lee Ritz, Jr., the debtor, was in financial control of Chrysalis. Moreover, Ritz was a director of Chrysalis and owned at least 30% of Chrysalis's common stock.
Between November 2006 and May 2007, Ritz transferred a substantial amount of Chrysalis's funds to various entities controlled by Ritz. Specifically, Ritz transferred: (1) $677,622 to ComCon Manufacturing Services, Inc.; (2) $121,831 to CapNet Securities Corp. (of which Ritz held an 85% ownership interest); (3) $52,600 to CapNet Risk Management, Inc. (of which Ritz held a 100% ownership interest); (4) $172,100 to Institutional Capital Management, Inc., and Institutional Insurance Management, Inc. (of which Ritz held 40% and 100% ownership interests, respectively); (5) $99,386.90 to Dynalyst Manufacturing Corp. (of which Ritz held a 25% ownership interest); (6) $26,500 to Clean Fuel International Corp. (of which Ritz held a 20% ownership interest); and (7) $11,240 to CapNet Advisors, Inc. With respect to each of these transfers, the bankruptcy court concluded that Chrysalis did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange. The bankruptcy court further determined that during this time, Chrysalis was operational, but was not paying its debts as they became due. The bankruptcy court found that at all relevant times, the sum of Chrysalis's debts was greater than that of Chrysalis's assets at a fair valuation.
In May 2009, Husky sued Ritz in federal district court, seeking to hold Ritz personally liable for Chrysalis's $163,999.38 debt.
In December 2009, Ritz filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas. In March 2010, Husky filed a complaint in the bankruptcy court initiating the adversary proceeding underlying this appeal. In the complaint, Husky objected to the discharge of Ritz's alleged debt, relying on 11 U.S.C. § § 523(a)(2)(A), 523(a)(4), and 523(a)(6).
The bankruptcy court held a trial in February 2011. The court issued its Memorandum Opinion, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, in August 2011. As noted above, the court found that the transfers Ritz orchestrated were not made for reasonably equivalent value. The court also found that Husky suffered damages due to these transfers--specifically, " in the amount of $163,999.38--which represents the amount owed to Husky by Chrysalis for the goods which Husky delivered to Chrysalis." In addition, the court determined that Ritz was " not a credible witness" due to his contradictory and evasive testimony, and due to his " selective" inability to recall certain information. In its conclusions of law, the bankruptcy court first addressed whether Ritz could be held liable for Chrysalis's debt under Texas veil-piercing laws. The court determined that, under Texas law, Husky had not established that Ritz perpetuated an " actual fraud" on Husky--a prerequisite for piercing the veil under Texas Business Organizations Code Section 21.223(b)--because Husky failed to show that Ritz made a false representation to Husky. The bankruptcy court found that the record was " wholly devoid of any such representation made by [Ritz]." For this same reason, the court determined that the " actual fraud" exception to discharge contained in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) did not apply. Finally, the bankruptcy court rejected the applicability of the " willful and malicious injury" exception to discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), concluding that Husky failed to sufficiently brief and adduce evidence on this provision, and stating that " [t]he record is wholly devoid of any proof that [Ritz] willfully and maliciously injured Husky or Husky's property." Accordingly, the bankruptcy court denied all of Husky's requested relief.
On appeal, the district court relied on a Fifth Circuit case issued after the bankruptcy court's decision, Spring Street Partners-IV, L.P. v. Lam, 730 F.3d 427 (5th Cir. 2013), in determining that Husky could pierce the corporate veil because there was sufficient circumstantial evidence suggesting that Ritz acted with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Husky. Nonetheless, the court held that Husky had not established actual fraud under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), which requires a misrepresentation. Finally, the district court rejected the applicability of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), as Husky " fail[ed] to ...