Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Thurman v. Cain

United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Monroe Division

May 11, 2015

JEFFREY K. THURMAN, LA. DOC #307604,
v.
WARDEN NATHAN BURL CAIN

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

KAREN L. HAYES, Magistrate Judge.

Pro se Petitioner Jeffrey K. Thurman, a prisoner in the custody of Louisiana's Department of Corrections, filed the instant Petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June 4, 2014. [doc. #1]. Petitioner attacks his convictions for distribution of cocaine, his subsequent adjudication as a third felony offender, and the six concurrent hard labor sentences imposed by the Third Judicial District Court, Lincoln Parish. This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the standing orders of the Court.

Background

The underlying facts in this case have been set forth by the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal as follows:

The Ruston Police Department and the Lincoln Parish Narcotics Enforcement Team (LPNET) received information from a reliable confidential informant, Donald Fields, that the defendant was selling cocaine. Mr. Fields had known the defendant since 2000, and had talked with the defendant around Easter in 2008 about buying drugs. On May 28, 2008, Mr. Fields and Lieutenant Michael Lestage of the Ruston Police Department and the LPNET began an investigation into the defendant's drug activities. Mr. Fields contacted the defendant and discussed purchasing cocaine. Mr. Fields went to the LPNET office where his vehicle and person were searched to insure that Mr. Fields was not in possession of any drugs. Mr. Fields was given $100 in "buy money." The money was photocopied to record the serial numbers. Mr. Fields was fitted with audio-video recording equipment. Mr. Fields drove his vehicle to a prearranged location to meet the defendant. Law enforcement officials followed him. Mr. Fields met the defendant and bought cocaine from him for $100.
Mr. Fields returned to the LPNET office where he handed over the cocaine along with the audio-video equipment. The cocaine was checked in as evidence and eventually transferred to the North Louisiana Crime Lab ("Crime Lab") where it was tested and determined to be cocaine. The recording from the audio-video equipment was transferred to a computer and put on a DVD. The defendant was not arrested at that point. According to Lieutenant Lestage, law enforcement officials wanted to show that this was not happenstance for the defendant, but something that he did on a regular basis. Mr. Fields contacted the defendant and made cocaine purchases on five more occasions.
On June 5, 2008, Mr. Fields went to the LPNET office, his vehicle and person were searched, he was fitted with audio-video equipment and he was given $100 in buy money. He made contact with the defendant, who told Mr. Fields to meet him at "Elzie's house." He was then directed to another location. Mr. Fields met the defendant at the designated location and followed him to a vacant lot. Mr. Fields purchased $100 worth of cocaine from the defendant. Mr. Fields returned to the LPNET office and handed over the audio-video equipment and the cocaine. The cocaine was placed into evidence. The contraband was transferred to the Crime Lab where it was tested and determined to be cocaine.
On June 10, 2008, the same procedure was followed where law enforcement officials searched Mr. Fields and his vehicle, gave him $100 in buy money, and equipped him with audio-video equipment. Mr. Fields went to Elzie's house and called the defendant to tell him he was in the area and was ready to make a drug buy. Elzie appeared and said he would take the money to the defendant and bring back the cocaine. Mr. Fields called the defendant and told him that he did not want any complications. The defendant assured Mr. Fields that there would not be any problems. Mr. Fields watched Elzie walk down the street to the defendant's house and then return with the cocaine. Mr. Fields turned the audio-video equipment over to the police along with the cocaine which was processed as evidence and transferred to the Crime Lab where it was tested and determined to be cocaine.
On June 12, 2008, Mr. Fields went to the LPNET office and followed the same procedure used in the past. He was given $100 in buy money and called the defendant to make a drug purchase. Mr. Fields told the defendant to come to Elzie's house. The defendant stated that he was around the corner. However, when Mr. Fields arrived, a young man walked up to his vehicle. Mr. Fields asked where the defendant was and the man replied, "I have it. I've got it." Mr. Fields paid the man the $100 and received cocaine. The cocaine was turned over to law enforcement officers, tested by the Crime Lab, and determined to be cocaine.
Lieutenant Lestage did not participate in the last two instances in which Mr. Fields bought drugs from the defendant. Lieutenant Chris Bittick, who had previously aided Lieutenant Lestage, was in charge of the last two drug buys. The focus of the investigation was Miketavious Brooks, not the defendant. Mr. Fields had furnished information to law enforcement officials that this individual was selling drugs.
Mr. Fields went to the LPNET office on August 5, 2008. His person and vehicle were searched, he was equipped with audio-video equipment, and he was given $80 in buy money. Mr. Fields telephoned Mr. Brooks from a convenience store and was told to come to Elzie's house and then to proceed to the end of a certain dead-end street if no one was at Elzie's. Mr. Fields followed the instructions and saw several men under a tree. Mr. Brooks did not appear, but the defendant came up to him and sold him $80 in cocaine. Mr. Fields was not able to get the defendant on the video recording because the transaction occurred so quickly. The cocaine was turned over to Lieutenant Bittick and eventually transferred to the Crime Lab where it was tested and determined to be cocaine.
On August 7, 2008, Mr. Fields again worked with Lieutenant Bittick with the goal of making a drug buy from Mr. Brooks. The same procedure was followed and Mr. Fields was given $80 in buy money. Mr. Fields contacted Mr. Brooks about buying drugs and went to the location directed by Mr. Brooks. Mr. Brooks did not appear, but the defendant arrived as a passenger in a car driven by an unknown female. Mr. Fields purchased $80 in cocaine from the defendant. He gave the cocaine to Lieutenant Bittick, who transferred it to the Crime Lab where it was tested and determined to be cocaine.
On November 20, 2008, the defendant was charged by bill of information with six counts of distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, cocaine. The defendant was tried by jury. The prosecution presented the testimony of Lieutenant Lestage, Lieutenant Bittick, and Donald Fields. The audio-video recordings of the drug buys were played for the jury. The defendant called Mr. Fields to testify. According to Mr. Fields, he was introduced to the defendant by Iva Jean Caldwell several years before the incidents forming the basis of this case. Iva Jean Caldwell testified; she denied introducing Mr. Fields to the defendant and said that Mr. Fields had a reputation in the community for not being truthful. The defendant also called Terry Stanley as a witness. He testified that Mr. Fields had a reputation for not telling the truth. The defendant was found guilty of all six counts.
In July 2009, the defendant was charged by bill of information with being a third felony offender. The prosecution alleged that the defendant had pled guilty to two counts of possession of cocaine in October 1999 and had entered a guilty plea to possession of cocaine and attempted possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in November 2005. The state requested that the defendant be sentenced as a third felony offender for all six counts of distribution of cocaine. A habitual offender hearing was held on March 9, 2010. The defendant was adjudicated a third felony offender on all counts. The defendant filed motions for new trial and for post verdict judgment of acquittal, which were denied by the trial court.
The defendant appeared before the court for sentencing on July 14, 2010. The trial court observed that, although the defendant had been adjudicated a third felony offender, he had previously been convicted of five felonies. The defendant had three convictions for distribution of cocaine that occurred outside the 10-year cleansing period of La. R.S. 15:529.1(C). The court concluded that the defendant had made his living by distributing drugs. According to the court, there was an undue risk of the defendant committing another crime, the defendant was in need of correctional treatment or a custodial environment best provided by commitment to an institution, and a lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the offense. As an aggravating factor, the trial court considered that the defendant obtained substantial income and resources from ongoing drug activities. The court noted that, based upon the defendant's adjudication as a third felony offender, the range for sentencing on each of the six counts of distribution of cocaine for which he had been convicted was 20 years to 60 years at hard labor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to serve 45 years at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for each of the six counts of distribution of cocaine for which he was convicted, with the sentences to be served concurrently. The defendant made an oral motion to reconsider the sentences which was denied by the trial court.

State v. Thurman, 71 So.3d 468, 469-71 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2011). The appellate court affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentences on June 22, 2011.[1] Id. at 474. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied Petitioner's subsequent application for writ of certiorari on February 3, 2012. State v. Thurman, 79 So.3d 1025 (La. 2012). Petitioner did not seek further direct review before the United States Supreme Court.

Petitioner filed an initial pro se application for post-conviction relief in the trial court on October 11, 2012, [doc. #17-1, p. 2], and a supplemental application on January 29, 2013. [doc. #17-1, p. 47]. The trial court denied relief on January 23, 2013, and June 10, 2013, respectively. [doc. #s 15-1, p. 45; 17-1, p. 57]. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal denied Petitioner's application for supervisory review on May 31, 2013. [doc. #17-1, p. 46]. The Louisiana Supreme Court, on January 17, 2014, likewise denied Petitioner's application. Id. at 127.

Petitioner filed the instant Petition on June 4, 2014. [doc. #1]. He raises the following assignments of error: (1) the trial court imposed excessive sentences; (2) the trial court imposed indeterminate sentences; (3) insufficient evidence; (4) the State knowingly utilized false and perjured testimony; (5) the trial court prevented defense counsel from effectively crossexamining the State's key witness; and (6) ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. The matter is now before the Court.

Law and Analysis

I. Standard of Review - 28 U.S.C. § 2254

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, governs habeas corpus relief. The AEDPA limits how a federal court may consider habeas claims. After the state courts have "adjudicated the merits" of an inmate's complaints, federal review "is limited to the record that was before the state court[.]" Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). An inmate must show that the adjudication of the claim in state court:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).

A decision is "contrary to" clearly established Federal law "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by... [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 740-41 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000)). "The contrary to' requirement refers to holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of... [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant statecourt decision." Id. at 740. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ only if the state court "identifies the correct governing legal principle from... [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies the principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 741.

Section 2254(d)(2) speaks to factual determinations made by the state courts. Federal courts presume such determinations to be correct; however, a petitioner can rebut this presumption by ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.