United States District Court, Middle District of Louisiana
RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JAMES J. BRADY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
This case is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 11) brought by defendant G4S Secure Solutions (USA) Inc. (G4S). Plaintiff Christine Flowers (Flowers) filed an opposition (Doc. 14) to which G4S replied (Doc. 18). Oral argument is unnecessary.
Flowers worked for G4S from January to December of 2012, and they assigned her to work as a security guard on buses traveling between Baton Rouge and New Orleans. Her supervisor was Brandon Gilmore (Gilmore), though when he was absent, Marc Blanchard (Blanchard) supervised Flowers. Around February or March 2012, Flowers complained to Kimberly Horton (Horton), G4S's office manager, and told Horton that Blanchard made her uncomfortable. Flowers' primary complaint was that Blanchard would call her every day as soon as he started work, which she considered "very strange" behavior. After she reported this incident, Flowers did not raise any issues with Blanchard for several months.
In July of 2012, Flowers complained about Blanchard again; this time, she pointed to four text messages that she received from Blanchard about not turning in her timesheets. Blanchard sent these messages in the middle of the night, between midnight and six, and Flowers again said that Blanchard's messages made her uncomfortable. The messages asked Flowers to turn in her time sheets, and Flowers indicated that she felt that Blanchard wanted her to come to work when he would be the only person there. Shortly after these complaints, G4S assigned Blanchard to a different position-for unrelated reasons, they claim-and Flowers no longer had contact with him. In October of 2012, Flowers called a G4S hotline to complain that Horton's response to her complaints about Blanchard was inadequate. Several days later, she filed a complaint with the Louisiana Civil Rights Commission (CRC) and claimed that her hours were reduced because of her reports about Blanchard; Flowers worked roughly sixty-five (65) hours per week after a coworker left, and when G4S hired a replacement, Flowers' hours dropped.
In December of 2012, G4S terminated Flowers. The impetus for her termination, according to G4S, was an expletive-filled rant that Flowers directed at Horton. After this rant, the company tried to conduct an investigation, but Flowers cancelled two meetings due to illness and a vacation, respectively. Flowers did contact Chad Starwalt (Starwalt), regional vice president, to make claims of harassment and unprofessional behavior in the Baton Rouge office. Starwalt met with Flowers in Baton Rouge and, G4S claims, found Flowers statements to be inconsistent and confusing. After speaking with Horton and obtaining her statement, Starwalt terminated Flowers and stated that the reasons were insubordination and unprofessional behavior. Flowers received her right to sue letter and filed suit in October of 2013, alleging both harassment and that she was terminated in retaliation for filing a complaint with the Louisiana Human Rights Commission and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
Standard of Review
A motion for summary judgment should be granted when the pleadings, depositions, answers to the interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A factual dispute is genuine when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., Ml U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The admissibility of evidence for summary judgment purposes conforms to the rules of admissibility at trial. Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 285 (5th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Material facts are those "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Whether a fact is material will depend on the substantive law. Id. When addressing a summary judgment motion, the court must make reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Evans v. City of Bishop, 238 F.3d 586, 589 (5th Cir. 2000). If the movant meets his initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to identify or produce evidence that establishes a genuine dispute of material fact. Allen v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 204 F.3d 619, 621 (5th Cir. 2000).
G4S makes several arguments. First, regarding the Title VII claims of sexual harassment and retaliatory firing, they argue that sexual harassment and termination are outside the scope of Flowers' EEOC charge, and as a result, she has not exhausted her administrative remedies. Second, regarding the Louisiana state law claims for sexual harassment and retaliatory firing, G4S argues that Flowers failed to meet the procedural requirements because she did not give G4S written notice thirty days before initiating legal proceedings. Third, G4S argues that there is insufficient evidence to establish a claim for sexual harassment. Fourth, G4S argues that Flowers cannot establish retaliation either for the reduction in hours or for the termination.
I. Scope of the Charge/Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
A suit under Title VII is limited to "the scope of the EEOC investigation which could reasonably grow out of the administrative charge." Fine v. GAP Chem. Corp., 995 F.2d 576, 578 (5th Cir. 1993). When evaluating the scope of the charge, courts "consider such factors as the alleged basis for the discrimination, dates of discriminatory acts specified within the charge, perpetrators of discrimination named in the charge, and any locations at which discrimination is alleged to have occurred." B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep't, 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002). The scope of an EEOC charge is construed liberally to protect lay persons who are not well-versed in employment discrimination law. Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970). G4S argues that because Flowers' charge only references retaliation by reducing her hours, retaliation by termination and sexual harassment are outside the scope of the charge. Further, they note, Flowers filed her charge in October, before she was terminated, and never filed an amended charge. Flowers, however, argues that harassment and termination are within the scope of her charge, claiming that these both "could reasonably grow" out of the charge.
First, with respect to termination, although the charge specifically mentions retaliation, her description is limited to her reduction in hours. As she did not amend her charge, that she filed the charge before her termination also supports finding termination outside the scope of her charge; G4S cannot reasonably expect retaliation for terminating Flowers to grow out of a charge that she filed before she was terminated. Second, sexual harassment is within the scope of the charge. Flowers did not check "sex" on her form (Doc. 14-2 at 1), but her "particulars" paragraph references a "harassment complaint" and another complaint about multiple messages to her personal cell phone at odd hours. This information sufficiently informs G4S that harassment may be a part of the EEOC investigation. Therefore, summary judgment will be granted in favor of G4S regarding the Title VII retaliation ...