United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
ORDER AND REASONS
SUSIE MORGAN, District Judge.
This is a civil action involving an insurance policy (the "Policy") between United States Fire Insurance Company ("U.S. Fire") and A-Port, LLC ("A-Port"). U.S. Fire seeks a declaratory judgment that it owes no duty to defend or indemnify A-Port and its employees against a state-court action filed by Willie Walton ("Walton"). The defendants have filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or in the alternative to stay pending resolution of the state-court action, or in the further alternative to compel joinder of Walton as an indispensable party.
The questions presented are several. First, the Court must determine whether this declaratory judgment action is justiciable. Second, the Court must determine whether it has authority to grant declaratory relief. Third, the Court must decide how to exercise its broad discretion to decide, stay, or dismiss this action. Finally, if the Court finds that any claim(s) are justiciable, that it has authority to grant declaratory relief, and that a stay or dismissal is inappropriate, the Court must determine whether Walton is an indispensable party under Rule 19, and, if so, whether joinder is feasible.
For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Motion is GRANTED in that U.S. Fire's indemnity claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as unripe. The Motion is DENIED in all other respects. The duty-to-defend claim will remain pending and is not stayed. Walton is not an indispensable party.
This coverage dispute stems from a personal injury action filed by Walton in state court (the "Walton Suit"). According to the petition, Walton's payroll employer "loaned his services" as a rigger to A-Port. Walton further alleges he sustained personal injury on October 31, 2012 while helping A-Port employees Clint Givens ("Givens") and Dustin Guidry ("Guidry") load a mudtank onto a flatbed trailer. During the loading process, the mudtank fell on Walton's left foot, causing "displaced fractures of the distal fibula and medial malleolus and associated subluxation of the talus." As a result of these injuries, Walton has undergone "two (2) open reductions with the implementation of stabilizing hardware and screws."
On October 24, 2013, Walton filed a negligence action in state court against A-Port, Givens, and Guidry. Walton seeks an unspecified amount of damages for "physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life's pleasures, past and future lost wages, and past and future medical expenses." The petition does not request attorneys' fees.
U.S. Fire is currently defending A-Port, Guidry, and Givens (collectively "A-Port") in the Walton Suit under a reservation rights in the Policy. On February 26, 2014, U.S. Fire filed this declaratory judgment action. U.S. Fire seeks two different declarations under the Policy: (1) that it owes no duty to defend A-Port in the Walton Suit, and (2) that it owes no duty to indemnify A-Port for any losses sustained as a result of the Walton Suit.
A-Port filed the instant motion on June 2, 2014. Resolution has been delayed due to developments in the Walton Suit. On August 12, 2014, the Walton Suit was dismissed on summary judgment. On September 29, 2014, Judge Robert Morrison, III granted a motion for devolutive appeal. The Walton Suit is currently pending on appeal.
The Court will begin by conducting a three-step inquiry. First, the Court will determine whether the action is justiciable. Second, the Court will determine whether it has authority to grant declaratory relief. Third, the Court will determine "how to exercise its broad discretion to decide or dismiss a declaratory judgment action." Then, as to any claims that survive this analysis, the Court will address whether Walton is an indispensable party.
The justiciability doctrines of standing, mootness, political question, and ripeness derive from Article III's "case or controversy" requirement. In a declaratory judgment action, justiciability often turns on ripeness. This case is no exception.
The ripeness doctrine is drawn "both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction." The purpose of this doctrine is to forestall "entanglement in abstract disagreements" through "avoidance of premature adjudication." "The key considerations are the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.'"
The Fifth Circuit has recognized that "applying the ripeness doctrine in the declaratory judgment context presents a unique challenge." This stems primarily from the fact that declaratory relief often involves an ex ante determination of rights, i.e., a determination of rights before an injury has occurred, that "exists in some tension with traditional notions of ripeness. Fortunately, this challenge is not presented today, because the Court's analysis is guided by a distinct subset of ripeness jurisprudence on insurance coverage disputes.
The case law distinguishes between the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify. Because diversity is premised on diversity of citizenship, these duties are defined by the laws of the forum state. Under Louisiana law, an insurer's duty to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify. The duty to defend is determined solely by comparing the pleadings against the insured with the insurance policy. "Unless unambiguous exclusion of all of the plaintiff's claims is shown, the duty to defend arises." Because the duty to defend does not depend on the outcome of the ...