United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
ORDER & REASONS
LANCE M. AFRICK, District Judge.
Before the Court is a motion filed by defendant, Inter-Con Security Systems Inc. ("Inter-Con"), pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss certain of plaintiff's claims in this employment discrimination case. Plaintiff, Amara Konate, has filed an opposition,  to which defendant has filed a reply. For the following reasons, defendant's motion is DENIED.
Inter-Con employed plaintiff as a security guard from March 2011 to May 2011, and again from January 2012 to March 2014. Plaintiff's first period of employment ended when Inter-Con terminated him after he failed a second attempt at a "shooting examination." Plaintiff was later rehired, but his second period of employment ended on March 20, 2014, after a series of alleged infractions.
Plaintiff's nation of origin is Guinea. He contends that he was subjected to discrimination on the basis of his national origin throughout his periods of employment with Inter-Con. In particular, plaintiff alleges that (1) in May 2011 he was terminated after failing to pass a second shooting examination, but that American co-workers were given extra opportunities to take the test in 2013; (2) in April 2013, during a work bid process, two American co-workers were allowed to select their desired post assignments despite plaintiff's seniority to those co-workers; (3) he was denied travel reimbursement which was granted to an American co-worker; and (4) he was disciplined and eventually terminated for a series of alleged work infractions, such as leaving his work station, when American co-workers received less punishment for comparable or more severe infractions.
Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination on March 31, 2014. The claim was dismissed and a right-to-sue letter was issued on April 14, 2014. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on July 15, 2014, alleging national-origin discrimination in violation of Title VII and the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law ("LEDL"). Inter-Con now moves pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for partial dismissal of plaintiff's claims to the extent that they are based on his May 2011 termination and the April 2013 bid process, which Inter-Con contends were not timely presented in the charge of discrimination.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Rule 12(b)(6)
A district court may dismiss a complaint, or any part of it, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if the plaintiff has not set forth a factual allegation in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007). As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explained in Gonzalez v. Kay:
"Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The Supreme Court recently expounded upon the Twombly standard, explaining that "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. It follows that "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not show[n]'-that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).
577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009).
This Court will not look beyond the factual allegations in the pleadings to determine whether relief should be granted. See Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). As noted above, however, the Court can consider the EEOC charge placed in the record by defendant because it is "referred to in the complaint and [is] central to the plaintiff's claim." See Hickingbottom, 2010 WL 3720672, at *2. In assessing the complaint, a court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and liberally construe all factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Spivey, 197 F.3d at 774; Lowrey v. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997). "Dismissal is appropriate when the complaint on its face show[s] a bar to relief.'" Cutrer v. McMillan, 308 F.Appx. 819, 820 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Clark v. Amoco Prod. Co., 794 F.2d 967, 970 (5th Cir. 1986)).
Both Title VII and the LEDL require a plaintiff to file a charge of discrimination within a designated limitations period following an alleged unlawful employment practice. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(3)(a) (300 days); La. Rev. Stat. § 23:303(D) (one year plus length of "any administrative review or investigation of the claim conducted by the federal [EEOC] or the Louisiana Commission on Human Rights, " up to six months); see also Watson v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc., No. 13-5503, 2014 WL 258999, at *6, 10 (E.D. La. Jan 22, 2014) (Africk, J.). "[D]iscrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges." Morgan v. Nat'l R.R. ...