United States District Court, Middle District of Louisiana
November 7, 2014
SHARON SUE LAHAYE AND ROBERT CLAUDE LAFAYETTE
For Sharon Sue Lahaye, Robert Claude Lafayette, Plaintiffs: Edward J. Walters, Jr., LEAD ATTORNEY, Darrel James Papillion, David Abboud Thomas, Walters, Papillion, Thomas, Cullens, LLC, Baton Rouge, LA.
For AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP, Defendant: E. Paige Sensenbrenner, LEAD ATTORNEY, Adams & Reese - N.O., New Orleans, LA; Jennifer Emily Barriere, Adams and Reese LLP, New Orleans, LA; Kellen James Mathews, Adams and Reese, Baton Rouge, LA; William David Shea, Adams & Reese - BR, Baton Rouge, LA.
RULING ON MOTION FOR STATUS CONFERENCE
STEPHEN C. RIEDLINGER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Before the court is plaintiffs' Motion for Status Conference. Record document number 15. The motion is opposed.
Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (6) on March 12, 2014. On March 28, 2014 this case was assigned for an initial scheduling conference to be held on May 22, 2014. Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion on April 2, 2014,  but they did not file an amended complaint, as they were permitted to do under Rule 15(a) (1) (B), Fed.R.Civ.p. Because the defendant's motion was still pending, on April 30, 2014 it filed a Consent Motion to Reset Scheduling Conference and Status Report Deadline, which was granted. The order granting the motion advised the parties that another scheduling conference would be set after the district judge ruled on the defendant's motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss is still pending.
Even though the motion to dismiss is still pending, the plaintiffs now move to set a status conference for the purpose of obtaining a scheduling order. Citing the procedural history of the case, particularly its pending motion to dismiss, the defendant argued that, in the interest of judicial economy and to reduce the cost of litigation, a status conference should not be held until the court rules on the motion to dismiss.
Defendant's argument is persuasive. Issuing a scheduling order at this time will force the parties to engage in discovery which likely will be costly and which may be unnecessary if the defendant's motion is granted, and the scope of any necessary discovery may be narrowed if the motion is only granted in part. A different conclusion may be warranted if the defendant had filed a clearly frivolous motion, but it did not. In these circumstances, there is no good reason to enter a scheduling order while the defendant's motion to dismiss is still pending, and therefore there is no good reason to have a status conference for the purpose of doing so.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs' Motion for Status Conference is denied.