that shipyard personnel were removing both propellers and both rudders. Lee promptly protested and was informed by shipyard personnel to contact Nolte Griffin and to tell him to bring some $1,700 if he wanted to get his boat back.
Since the vessel no longer could navigate, Lee retrieved the rudders, which had been left on the dock, and made arrangements, that night, to have the Southerner towed from the shipyard to Harvey, Louisiana. Upon being informed of the seizure of the propellers, Nolte Griffin contacted defendant shipyard's personnel and was told that he would have to pay the $1,727.31 that he owed for work on the other vessel, the Boy, in order to secure the release of the Southerner's propellers. Nolte Griffin offered to pay the costs of the repairs to the Southerner but that was unacceptable to defendant.
Some days later Nolte Griffin, accompanied by Roy Barrios, again returned to the shipyard, in another attempt to have the Southerner's propellers released by paying the current indebtedness. At this meeting Barrios told Vincent Moore, general manager of the shipyard, that he would personally guarantee the payment of the $410.97 due for repairs to the Southerner's propellers, but Moore declined to return the wheels unless Barrios also guaranteed the payment of the $1,727.31 due for repairs to the Boy.
Since no other propellers which would fit the Southerner could be readily obtained, the Southerner was inoperative and the plaintiffs lost their contract to transport shells for Little Lake Dredging Company. Because of this, Nolte Griffin was forced to sell his share of the vessel inasmuch as, without the income derived from the contract, he was unable to make the monthly payments due on the vessel.
It was not until July 22, 1966, that plaintiffs finally effected the release of the propellers from defendant and were able to get the Southerner operative once again.
Although, under Louisiana law, defendant has a privilege for the current work being performed on the Southerner,1 this privilege did not extend to work performed on another occasion on another vessel.
The conduct of defendant's employees constituted a wrongful conversion of the plaintiffs' property. In Lafleur v. Sylvester,
the court defined conversion as
"* * * any distinct act of dominion wrongfully asserted over another's personal property."